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Abstract 
All in the Family: Three Studies on Kinship, Networks and Career Outcomes 
 
Yasaman Gorji, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2018 
 
The first essay studies the impact of kinship by distinguishing between two forms of nepotism on 
the career outcome of the show business families’ descendants. We show that within more modern 
industries which are characterized by the boundaryless career environment, direct nepotism is not 
as efficient as indirect nepotism. We hypothesize that indirect forms of nepotism are evident in the 
form of network sponsorship by third-party associates of prominent show business families in the 
Hollywood movie industry. This study predicts that sponsorship will have significant beneficial 
effects on show business family relatives' career performance and that the effect is accentuated for 
women in show business families. We find strong support for our sponsorship hypotheses, but we 
also note the continuing importance of direct forms of family preferment in an industry 
characterized by single-project organizations and boundaryless careers. 
The second essay studies the extended definition of kinship, namely Marriage. It poses the question 
of whether contemporary intra-professional marriage may be a type of elective affinity 
(McKinnon, 2010), an institution used reciprocally to further the professional careers of two 
individuals. The study hypothesizes that marriage benefits spouses by allowing them to capitalize 
on each other’s accumulated social capital to increase their employability. 
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Moreover, marriage benefits spouses by allowing them to capitalize on Alter’s accumulated social 
capital to ascend the industry executive hierarchy by being hired in managerial roles. Also, 
marriage disproportionately benefits women by enabling female ego to capitalize on male spouse 
accumulated social capital such that gender bias can be overcome by enabling female ego’s 
increased involvement in projects and managerial roles. Our study indicates that marriage between 
Hollywood industry participants and the potential for borrowed spousal capital creates benefits 
both parties. It demonstrates that the extent to which alter has extensive connections, centrality, 
and better status, will benefit in terms of more opportunities for employment. Moreover, 
interestingly, a closed network with more constraint is also be beneficial in a project-based 
industries. 
The final essay investigates the impact of positive status shift for a member of a show business 
family and its possible positive or negative reputations spillover effect on the other members of 
the family. Family members’ impact on individuals’ career choices, career paths, and career 
development has been a topic for empirical research for a few decades. However, whether a 
positive status shift would generate spillover benefits to those closely associated with the winners 
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The body of family firm literature typically focuses on traditional corporate and legal models of 
commerce even when it does examine cultural industries (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2015), 
despite the fact that there is a general movement in the family firm academic research to emphasize 
the context of each industry as an important determinant in the composition, dynamic, and 
performance of family businesses. Family members influence individuals’ career development 
through family structural and process factors (Whiston & Keller, 2004). However, within more 
modern industries that are characterized by the bound 
aryless career environment, kinship as well as sociological drivers, such as social capital and 
cultural norms, define and bind the industry and contribute to the success of non-traditional family 
businesses. Kinship and sociological supports are rarely addressed in family firm literature. As 
Stewart (2003) suggest, kinship is largely absent from the family firm. Few if any family business 
scholars have contributed to this stream of literature. As Ingram and Lifschitz (2006) postulate, 
research attention still focuses on transactional governance rather than “relational governance,” 
which, constitute the veins of the economic corpus. 
This thesis seeks to fill a void in the academic literature with respect to career development in non-
traditional family business, via the lens of kinship and family support, and by mainly focusing on 
borrowed social capital and gender differences. We adapted the extended definition of kinship that 
includes marriage (Stewart, 2003; Stewart, 2010) unlike Fox’s (1983) and some other scholars 
who distinguish kinship and marriage. The contrasting spillover effects of positive status shifts of 
a family member (Heinich, 2009) has remained debatable. Positive status shifts may produce 
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negative spillover effects for those closely associated with the winners, or result in positive 
spillover effect in some other contexts.  
In seeking to accomplish these ends, this study links disparate areas of academic work in order to 
provide a more robust framework for the analysis of family firms within the cultural industries. 
This thesis addresses the following aspects of kinship, borrowed social capital and career outcome 
within the nuclear family, between married couples and in the form of status spillover effect in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively. 
In Chapter 2 (Essay 1), we explored two forms of nepotism, namely direct and indirect. The former 
refers to parental favoring of their descendants for valuable posts or occupations, often without 
regard to descendants’ abilities (Bellow, 2003). Indirect nepotism is meritocratic; a favored 
descendent must demonstrate appropriate competence and achievement to attain a valued position 
or occupation. We argue that families exercise indirect nepotism when they engage in dynastic 
strategies designed to transmit a ‘package’ of human, social, and cultural capital that enable their 
descendants to flourish in highly competitive labor markets. Indirect nepotism is especially 
relevant for careers in cultural and creative industries where individual performance attributes can 
be difficult to assess objectively, and in such industries, employers will be influenced by third-
party social evaluations and other markers of achievement (Koppman, 2016; Le Breton‐Miller & 
Miller, 2015). We draw upon the concept of sponsorship the social capital theory of network 
sponsorship (Burt, 2000). 
We theorize a temporally nuanced theory of sponsorship, suggesting that individuals must develop 
competence and skills before they can benefit from their family’s social capital. We develop and 
test three hypotheses: 1) predict direct nepotism will be weaker than indirect nepotism in the first 
decade of a relatives career, 2) indirect nepotism will not be evident at the early stages of an 
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individual's career but will increase over time, 3) a gender moderating hypothesis, suggesting that 
females derive greater advantage from indirect nepotism, since females prematurely situate 
themselves in closed networks which reduces their access to career opportunity (Lutter, 2015 
Bevelander & Page, 2011). 
Empirically, we extract data from the International Movie Database (IMDb). Our sample consists 
of 150 show business families and 3,500 relationships amongst them, between the years 1970 and 
2015. 
We consider the influence of show-business family social capital on relatives’ career performance 
in the hypercompetitive Hollywood movie industry.  
This paper makes three important contributions. First, it contributes to an understanding of 
sponsorship forms of social capital on individual career performance outcomes in networked 
industries, where individuals pursue boundaryless careers seeking performance roles in single 
project organizations (SPOs) (Arthur, & Rousseau, 2001). Second, we address the pervasive issue 
of gender discrimination in network industries and investigate the understudied effects of 
intergenerational kinship strategies and how industry-based families can mitigate inequities on 
female career performance by engaging in direct and indirect forms of nepotism. Third, we 
contribute to understandings about the sources of competitive advantages derived from kinship 
networks in globally competitive industries comprised of diverse actors including large public 
corporations, and complex ecology of social evaluators, who influence perceptions, judgments and 
hiring preferences. 
In Chapter 3 (Essay 2), we focused on the extended definition of kinship, namely Marriage. The 
questions arise as how couples in the same profession help each other to prosper in contemporary 
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labor markets. It is a response to many calls for more research and attention to family related 
differences including marriage norms (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006, p. 94; Bocatto, Gispert, & Rialp, 
2010; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). We note that theorists of dynastic intermarriage do not see a direct 
causal relationship between intermarriage and any specific material outcome, rather intermarriage 
is more often understood as an outcome or ‘derivative of a certain social and moral cohesion’ 
(Lisle-Williams, 1998:335). We reason that shifting patterns of work and career structure, in 
response to a variety of economic and technological factors such as globalization and the growth 
of the knowledge economy, is accentuating the importance of social networks and social capital 
as a means of ‘getting a job’ (Granovetter 1985|2018). Specifically, we note that many 
contemporary labor markets are characterized by project-based organizations and boundaryless 
career environments (Arthur & Rousseau, 2001). We consider the question of whether marriage is 
an elective affinity, and if it may be reasonably viewed as a tool for building social capital. We 
view intra-profession marriage as a form of reciprocal nepotism (Jaskiewicz, Uhlenbruck, Balkin 
& Reay, 2013), where each party may actively promote their partner's career interests. 
We argue that in project-based organizations, settings spouses’ accumulated social capital 
can be beneficially transferred between themselves to help one another advance in the hierarchy 
of roles and increase the number of projects in which each spouse is hired. We develop and test 
three hypotheses concerning this general premise, namely that: 1) Marriage benefits spouses by 
allowing ego to capitalize on Alter’s accumulated social, to increase ego’s number of career 
projects compared with the number of pre-marriage projects. 2) Marriage benefits spouses by 
allowing enabling ego to capitalize on Alter’s accumulated social capital to ascend the industry 
executive hierarchy by being hired in managerial roles. 3) Marriage disproportionately benefits 
women by enabling female ego to capitalize on male Alter’s accumulated social capital, such that 
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gender bias can be overcome by enabling female ego’s increased involvement in projects and 
managerial roles (Burt, 1998; Bevelander & Page, 2011). 
Empirically, in Chapter 3, we test our hypotheses in the context of the U.S. film production 
industry (“Hollywood”), which is considered to be an exemplar of a boundaryless, project-based, 
and creative industry (Jones, Borgatti & Walsh, 1998). We employ data from the International 
Movie Database (IMDb), which contains career data points on 17,000 couples that have produced, 
directed or were cast in US feature films. We select a sample of 1,168 married couples active in 
Hollywood between 1970 and 2011. Three married couples considered in this analysis had credits 
in a specified number of Hollywood films. Specifically, spouses are only considered and included 
in this study if they have a specified minimum number of film credits namely, three in a period of 
five years before being married, and actively continue working in the industry for at least three 
years post-marriage. A bi-modal data of movie-actors was collected from IMDB. After cleansing 
the data, we transformed the bi-modal network to uni-modal (actor-actor) network over the past 
40 years, from 1975 to 2015. The network consists of US feature films and the their core crew. 
We chose two measures of centrality that well-known, widely used and accepted in the network 
related studies, namely Degree centrality, Eigen centrality and Burt’s constraint (reversed to show 
the extent of structural holes). We picked negative binomial regression over Poisson because it is 
more flexible for data that shows over-dispersion, whereas Poisson distribution assumes that the 
mean and variance are the same. 
The paper contributes to an understanding of sponsorship forms of social capital on individual 
career performance outcomes in networked industries, where individuals pursue boundaryless 
careers seeking performance roles in single-project organizations (SPOs) (Arthur, & Rousseau, 
2001). Secondly, we address the pervasive issue of gender discrimination in network industries 
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and investigate the understudied effects of intergenerational kinship strategies and how industry-
based families can mitigate inequities on female career performance by engaging in direct and 
indirect forms of nepotism. Thirdly, we contribute to understandings about the sources of 
competitive advantages derived from kinship networks in globally competitive industries, 
comprised of diverse actors, including large public corporations and complex ecology of social 
evaluators, who influence perceptions, judgments and hiring preferences. In such settings, we 
show that enterprising families’ can produce a co-specialization of assets, which are reproduced 
and inserted into hybrid corporate-kinship network structures. Finally, we contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding of success in boundaryless careers through time. Thus, while the 
characteristics of cultural industries macrostructure have been analyzed and defined and has 
documented the absence of mobility from the industry periphery to its core of celebrities and stars 
(Jones, Borgatti & Walsh 1997); there have been no long-term studies on the effect of families and 
their social capital on individuals’ career entry and subsequent career performance. 
Chapter Four (Essay 3) explores the impact of positive status shift for a member of a show business 
family and its possible positive or negative reputations spillover effect for the other active family 
members within the industry. 
Family members’ impact on individuals’ career choices, career paths, and career development has 
been a topic for empirical research for a few decades. However, whether a highly recognized 
family member can be a source of inspiration for another family member and the possible 
generated spillover benefits to those closely associated with the winners’ entourage is 
understudied. There are contradicting discourses about the positive and negative effects of status 




Indirect Nepotism: Network Sponsorship, Social Capital and Career 
Performance in Show Business Families. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
How can families help advance the careers of their descendants in highly competitive labor 
markets? A time-honored tradition is nepotism, favoring one's children or relatives in promotion 
and recruitment decisions. However, as a form of discrimination, nepotism is considered socially 
illegitimate (Jaskiewicz, Uhlenbruck, Balkin & Reay, 2013) and rational-bureaucratic employers 
will typically proscribe it (Fukuyama, 2014). Indeed, publicly listed family firms are viewed with 
suspicion by capital because they are associated with nepotism and investors frequently discount 
their shares (Miller et al., 2013). Despite its social illegitimacy nepotism is widely practiced 
beyond the family firm and is most prevalent at the highest levels of the income hierarchy (Corak, 
2013) with a strong positive effect on descendants’ lifetime earnings and wealth outcomes 
(Hansen, 2014; Mazumder, 2005). For example, the children of physicians are significantly more 
likely to be admitted to medical schools (Lentz & Laband, 1989). There is a growing recognition 
of the ubiquity of network and social capital mechanisms generating cumulative advantage to 
individuals resulting in growing inequality of social and economic outcomes (Di Maggio & Garip, 
2012). Thus, questions arise as to how nepotism is practiced in contemporary labor markets that 
value merit and achievement as criteria for career advancement regarding its timing, differential 
gender effects and how enterprising business families prosper in globally competitive industries. 
In this paper, we distinguish between direct and indirect nepotism. The former refers to parental 
favoring of their descendants for valuable posts or occupations, often without regard to 
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descendants’ abilities (Bellow, 2003). Indirect nepotism is meritocratic; a favored descendent must 
demonstrate appropriate competence and achievement to attain a valued position or occupation. 
We argue that families exercise indirect nepotism when they engage in dynastic strategies designed 
to transmit a ‘package’ of human, social, and cultural capital that enable their descendants to 
flourish in highly competitive labor markets. In post-industrial societies where career performance 
depends upon individuals’ embeddedness in appropriate networks and the possession of advanced 
human capital, we suggest that indirect nepotism will displace the direct forms of preferment.  
Indirect nepotism is especially relevant for careers in cultural and creative industries where 
individual performance attributes can be difficult to assess objectively, and in such industries, 
employers are influenced by third-party social evaluations and other markers of achievement 
(Koppman, 2016; Le Breton‐Miller & Miller, 2015).  We draw upon the social capital theory of 
network sponsorship (Burt, 2000). Sponsorship depends for its effectiveness upon third-party 
perceptions of an individual's performance qualities. Hence, sponsors will be unwilling to refer an 
unqualified individual without risking potential damage to their valued reputation. Thus, we 
theorize a temporally nuanced theory of sponsorship, suggesting that individuals must develop 
competence and skills before they can benefit from their family’s social capital.  
Empirically we extract data from International Movie Database (IMBb), with a sample size of 150 
show business families and 3500 relationships amongst them between the years 1970 and 2015. 
We consider the influence of show-business family social capital on relatives’ career performance 
in the hypercompetitive Hollywood movie industry. We consider the phenomena of industry 
participants from show business families, (which we describe as an individual with credits in a 
specified number of Hollywood film, who has at least two blood relatives in the industry, see 
example figure 1) and their capacity to foster the career performance of their relatives within the 
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industry. We reason that show business families’ accumulated social capital can be beneficially 
transferred to succeeding generations and with temporally increasing effects. We develop and test 
three hypotheses that 1) predict direct nepotism will be weaker than indirect nepotism in the first 
decade of a relatives career; 2) that indirect nepotism will be less evident in the early stages of an 
individual's career but will increase over time; and 3) a gender moderating hypothesis, suggesting 
that females derive greater advantage from indirect nepotism. 
Thus, our empirical setting departs from much of the mainstream family business literature with 
its focus upon the operating family firm. Drawing on recent distinctions between family business 
and business family (Steier, Chrisman, & Chua, 2015; Nason, Mazzelli, & Carney, 2018) we 
define our family unit of analysis as an enterprising business family that resembles the 
entrepreneurial aspects of an enterprising family as described by Habbershon & Pistrui (2002). 
However, we draw attention to extensive multigenerational family involvement in the professions, 
such as law and medicine and other fields of endeavor including politics, athletics, and 
entertainment. Bellow describes such families as ‘fictive corporations,’ which he defines as ‘a 
highly disciplined organization built of relatives, friends, and associates knit together by nepotism 
and quasi-nepotistic ties’ (Bellow, 2003: 425).       
The paper contributes to an understanding of sponsorship forms of social capital on individual 
career performance outcomes in networked industries, where individuals pursue boundaryless 
careers seeking performance roles in single project organizations (SPOs) (Arthur, & Rousseau, 
2001). Secondly, we address the pervasive issue of gender discrimination in network industries 
and investigate the understudied effects of intergenerational kinship strategies and how industry-
based families can mitigate inequities on female career performance by engaging in direct and 
indirect forms of nepotism. Third, we contribute to understandings about the sources of 
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competitive advantages derived from kinship networks operating within globally competitive 
industries.  These industries, such as Hollywood, are comprised of diverse actors including large 
public corporations and complex ecology of social evaluators who influence perceptions, 
judgments and hiring preferences. In such settings, we show that enterprising families can produce 
a co-specialization of assets, which are reproduced and inserted into hybrid corporate-kinship 
network structures. Finally, we contribute to a more nuanced understanding of success in 
boundaryless careers through time. Thus, while the characteristics of cultural industries 
macrostructure have been analyzed and defined and has documented the absence of mobility from 
the industry periphery to its core of celebrities and stars (Jones, Borgatti & Walsh 1997); there 
have been no long-term studies of the effect of families and their social capital on individuals’ 
career entry and subsequent career performance.  We begin by deriving our three hypotheses, 
describe our sample and methodology and results before discussing our contributions and the 
implications for future research. 
2.2. Theory & hypotheses 
The belief that family enterprises can transmit valuable skills and knowledge to family members 
is well established in the family business literature (Handler, 1994). Intergenerational transfer of 
entrepreneurial and managerial acumen is often reflected in the adage ‘shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves 
in three generations’ suggesting the non-heritability of such skills. Similar findings, suggesting 
that talent is not fully heritable are evident in longitudinal studies of parental effects on 
descendants’ labor market outcomes. For example, Becker and Tomes (1994) investigated 
differences between lifetime earning elders and descendants finding that the intergenerational 
elasticity (IGE) of income, the estimated correlation between fathers and sons’ incomes, at only 
0.2, a low correlation suggesting that the incomes of children born of wealthy parents rapidly 
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regress to the mean. Becker and Tomes conclude that “practically all the advantages or 
disadvantages of ancestors tend to disappear in only three generations” (1986, p. S28). However, 
financial and physical assets, such as a family business, are fully heritable (Carney, Gedajlovic & 
Strike, 2014).   
Others argue that in the contemporary post-industrial and knowledge-based economy the effects 
of financial wealth inheritance is overrated and is declining among the wealthiest families. To 
reflect the changing economic and technological conditions in the knowledge economy families 
have modified their inheritance practices.  The arrival of the post-industrial economy has produced 
a fundamental shift in contemporary character and practice of intergenerational wealth 
transmission (Dobkin-Hall & Marcus, 1998). Families now transfer less wealth in the form of 
inheritances. Wealth transmission for today's middle and upper-class families centers on a 
radically different type of asset, investments in skills and human capital. Transfer no longer occurs 
on the passing of elders but during parents' lifetime. Thus, intergenerational wealth transmission 
today has shifted from testamentary toward inter vivos transfers, reflecting the importance of skills 
and knowledge as the foundation for effective performance in the most valued careers and 
occupations. Indeed, the social legitimacy of inherited physical and financial wealth has declined 
in modern societies (Beckert, 2008) and the greatest social esteem is reserved for earned income, 
that is, to wealth that embodies the fruits of human capital (Kaplan and Rauh, 2013). 
In advanced economies, some of the most prized and well-paid occupations are found in high 
intellectual and human capital industries. Among these are occupations in the creative, cultural 
and arts-related industries where valued skills and human capital are hard to determine. This is 
because qualities such as creativity, star quality, talent, inventiveness, connoisseurship, aesthetic 
judgment and other specialized expertise such as writing and musical composition ambiguous and 
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not easily quantified (Florida, 2014; Le Breton Miller & Miller, 2016; Lingo & Tepper, 2013).  In 
knowledge-intensive industries we have witnessed the growth of project organization structures 
(Faulkner & Anderson, 1987), that is employment in temporary project-based structures, and the 
emergence of boundaryless careers characterised by individuals moving between employers 
market-based recognition of performance attributes and the prevalence of extra organizational 
information networks (Sullivan & Baruch, 2009). Indeed, the Hollywood movie industry can be 
considered the archetype of project organization structures and boundaryless careers (Jones & 
Walsh 1997). 
Boundaryless careers have been the focus of the new working arrangements emerging over the 
new millennium (Arthur, Rousseau 2001; Sullivan and Arthur 2006; Arthur 2014). These careers 
have key characteristics that distinguish them from traditional organization-based careers. Chief 
amongst them is the idea that an individual’s career moves across boundaries of separate 
employers. As a result, learning and increased competencies accrue to the employee, and the 
markers of success tend to variate between objective and subjective. These careers draw validation 
from outside of the organization suggesting that external networks (networks outside of the 
employing organization) sustain and strengthen these careers (Arthur, 2014). Finally, these careers 
are marked by the independence from, rather than the dependence on, traditional organizational 
career engagements. However, despite their increased presence within the literature, relatively 
little research has focused on the manner in which success is assessed within these careers. As the 
employees themselves direct the progression of these careers, the criteria of success tend to change 
over time. Not only that, but there is also an acute absence of studies that focus on the gender 
differences which are very likely to be present in boundaryless careers given that learning and 
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competencies that an individual accumulates in their portfolio are dependent on external networks 
and ambiguous processes of evaluations. 
In such industries, the possession and effective utilization of creativity and other related qualities 
are very difficult to identify and assess (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2016). Due to the inherent 
ambiguity in identifying and appraising creative and cultural talent, evaluators will rely upon social 
evaluations and other non-performance markers of appropriate merit. Social evaluations theory 
comprise several related constructs including legitimacy,  reputation, and status (Bitektine, 2011) 
as well as negative markers such as stigma (Devers et al., 2009). This emerging body of literature 
suggests social evaluations form the basis of evaluators’ perceptions, judgments, and actions. 
Social evaluations have been identified in the advertising industry where Koppman (2016) finds 
that the recruitment of creative copywriters is frequently based upon on cultural similarities, with 
recruiters preferring ‘cultural omnivores.' In these professions, recruiters view diverse cultural 
interests and achievements as symbols of creative ability compared to formal educational 
credentials such as a degree in advertising. Hence, career performance in creative industries is 
influenced much more by complex social evaluations performed by a variety of social evaluators. 
Multiple agents including the media, peers, and agents who hire creative and cultural talent 
perform social evaluations in the Hollywood movie industry on individuals who are hired to 
produce marketable products. The media includes journalists, critics, reviewers, bloggers and other 
arbiters of good taste who contribute to the construction of individual reputations for artistic merit 
and who mediate between creative and cultural producers and the audiences who consume their 
performances. Industry peers, actors, directors and copywriters also perform social evaluations 
making private and public judgments of their peers, most evident in the granting of prestigious 
awards such as the Oscars. Perhaps most importantly, social evaluations are made by producers, 
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talent agencies, and representatives who promote a stable of performers and talent to casting 
agents, producers, and directors who are responsible for recruitment decisions. Hence it is in this 
context that we consider social evaluations concerning behavior resembling direct and indirect 
nepotism, the latter in the form of sponsorship. 
2.2.1. Show business families and nepotism 
Multigenerational show business families are ubiquitous in Hollywood. Consider the following 
example of the extended Coppola-Schwartzman-Cage show business family comprising, actors 
and actresses, movie producers, directors, screenwriters, and soundtrack composers. 
-Figure 1: about here- 
Bellow (2003) identifies scores of second and third generation executives and performers in the 
Hollywood movie industry as well as musicians, producers, and singers in the music business. 
Moreover, he documents the prevalence of comparable multigenerational families in a wide variety 
of professional career settings, including law, medicine, TV, the arts, sports, and American 
politics. Show business families are not legally registered businesses that are in any sense family-
owned. However, as fictive corporations (Bellow, 2003) or enterprising families (Habbershon & 
Pistrui, 2002) they represent families in businesses, which are not widely researched in the family 
business literature.  Bureaucratic and kinship-based organizations enjoy different competitive 
advantages based on an ability to manage different types of assets (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). 
In many industries, bureaucratic and kinship organization form hybridized structures with co-
specialized assets. For example, in business format franchising, large automobile companies enjoy 
advantages with R&D, engineering, and mass-manufacturing; while smaller, often family-owned, 
enterprises manage the sales function in localized dealerships. We suggest family enterprises in 
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the movie industry and other professions identified by Bellow (2003) represent comparable forms 
of asset co-specialization.  
Direct Versus Indirect Nepotism 
We reason that these professional families can provide their descendants with a resource bundle 
that complements and contributes to the development of industry-specific skills and reputation.  In 
the Hollywood movie industry Jones, Borgatti & Walsh (1998) identify a core skill-set that it is 
universally valued comprising social skills and, in particular, collaborative skills which refer to the 
ability to work constructively and effectively with other creative and cultural workers in project 
organization structures. Core skills are also contained in craft and technical skills, as well as a rich 
variety of aesthetic skills. This core skill set requires industry-specific experience and take some 
time to curate and to project favorably toward important social evaluators. Various forms of social 
capital are also seen as an important, but there are different forms of this resource or asset, which 
we now consider. 
 We suggest families can provide an advantage to their descendants in the form of human, social 
and cultural capital. The role of family social capital in the creation of human capital is documented 
by Coleman (1988), who specifies the importance of social network closure in the creation of 
children's superior educational attainment. A comparable process of closure has been identified in 
the family business literature regarding a family’s transmission of firm-specific and tacit 
knowledge (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Additionally, show business families may offer resources and 
survivability capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) in the form of financial and emotional support. This is 
especially valauble in the early stages of descendants’ careers where newcomers have yet to 
establish competence, reputation, and industry-specific qualities and there is much uncertainty 
about their progress and industry. Thus, we expect relatives of established show business families 
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to benefit from beneficial industry and project-specific human capital in the form of relevant 
knowledge and resources.  
A different form of social capital is identified by Burt (2000) who recognises the importance of 
network brokerage and network sponsorship. The former refers to network ties that bridge 
structural holes between relatively closed and localized networks. Network sponsorship refers to 
a hierarchical relationship between a broker with extensive network ties across structural holes 
which may ‘lend' the social capital to a third party which lacks similar ties by sponsoring the third-
party into more distant networks. Note that sponsorship implies a hierarchical relationship between 
the broker and the sponsored individual since the former has achieved a greater reputational status 
while the sponsored individual ‘borrows’ this resource, which Burt (2000)  refers to as borrowed 
social capital. We expect that show business families will furnish their descendants with contacts 
to their networks to create opportunities for sponsorship. The relationship between director 
Stephen Spielberg and leading actor Tom Hanks, who has performed in five Spielberg productions 
is an example of such sponsorship. Spielberg has also cast Tom Hanks’ son, Chet Hanks, in the 
movie” " Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull” in 2008 which marked the second 
movie in Chet Hank’s filmography at the age of 18. Thus we reason that the social proximity 
between Spielberg and Tom Hanks will typically allow for an improved capacity to assess an 
individual’s actual and potential capabilities. The sponsors’ proximity should instill greater 
confidence and willingness to furnish information about career opportunities as well as directly 
sponsor the individual to relevant parties in their networks, for example, by advocating their 
particular cultural and creative performance qualities or by casting him or her in their productions. 
We use the latter example as our definition of sponsorship in this paper.   
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Nepotism may also be considered to be part of resource package that show business families can 
confer upon their relatives. Families may be willing to exercise direct nepotism, i.e., preferment 
of a relative without regard to ability, due to a halo effect where families may fail to assess 
descendants’ true abilities adequately. For example, actor and producer Will Smith cast his son, 
Jaden Smith, in a leading role in the 2013 movie ‘After Earth.’ The project was a box office flop 
and excoriated by critics. As social evaluators consider nepotism in broadly negative terms, then 
a nepotistic family may pay a reputational penalty in the form of negative judgments with potential 
consequence for negative effects on the senior member’s career performance. However, families 
may be prone to parental altruism (Lubatkin et al. 2005) and willingness to sacrifice one's utilities 
for the benefit of a descendant. 
We expect that because direct nepotism will signal preferment of a family member without due 
regard to ability and will be incompatible with industry norms, it is likely to be perceived with 
suspicion by social evaluators. Within the family business literature, nepotism is often associated 
with the entrenchment of incompetent and unqualified family members in senior roles (Bertrand 
& Schoar, 2006) and firm owners must demonstrate compensating advantages to attain favorable 
judgments from capital market investors (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2013). Thus, we expect that 
the relatives and descendants of show business families will tend to attract attention but social 
evaluators will suspend their judgment of their merit. Indeed, we suspect that among some 
evaluators direct nepotism will carry the stigma of unmerited preferment. Accordingly, we reason 
that while show business families may have advantages over industry outsiders in career 
performance due to beneficial resource bundle compared with individuals receiving no nepotistic 
support. For example, like many Hollywood performers Dominic Ceci, with no familial 
connections in the industry, started his career in 2004. He was cast in three movies, between 2004 
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and 2006 but was not cast again afterwards; similar examples are abundant. Nevertheless, we 
reason that direct nepotism will have a weak effect on relatives’/descendants’ career performance: 
Hypothesis 1: direct forms of nepotism will have a weaker effect on descendants’ career 
performance compared with sponsorship forms of social capital.  
2.2.2. Sponsorship and borrowed social capital 
In project-based labor markets, social capital creates access to valuable information and reduces 
search costs, positively affecting career development by helping individuals acquire new jobs, 
establish opportunities for future collaborations and form ties with others who provide social and 
emotional support. Getting cast and advancing one's career in the Hollywood movie industry will 
depend heavily on the depth and breadth of one's interpersonal networks (Lutter, 2015).  These 
beneficial effects will increase when individuals have access to sponsors with accumulated 
brokerage advantages in networks characterized by structural holes (Burt, 2000). Show business 
families are likely to be embedded within industry networks, and will typically possess multiple 
non kin based friendships and prior associations with influential third parties. With this hypothesis, 
we suggest that such linkages will represent better instruments for furthering the careers of show 
business family members. 
We reason that compared with direct nepotism, preferment by nonfamily members will receive 
more positive social evaluations. This is because friends and associates are a step removed from 
the family, and friends and associates in the industry have their reputations to maintain. Such 
individuals will typically base their perceptions and actions on less distorted evaluations. Non-
family friends and associates are unlikely to suffer the ‘halo’ distortions that can be made by 
parents and are unlikely to be prone to parental altruism (Lubatkin et al. 2005). Accordingly, we 
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expect that these social evaluators will be better able to assess show business family members’ 
performance attributes. Thus, we expect that non-relative friends and associates of families will be 
unwilling to pay a reputation penalty by rendering a distorted social evaluation. Therefore, their 
recommendations and evaluations are likely to be seen as more favorable by other social 
evaluators.  
Advancing one's career through third-party friends and or acquaintances is common in the United 
States, and a substantial proportion of all jobs are found in this way (Granovetter, 1974|1995). 
Moreover, the highest wages are paid to those who find jobs through ‘prior generation males' who 
know the employer or who serve as a reference (Loury, 2006). Thus, we expect that because friends 
and associates will adopt a more objective view on an individual’s creative and cultural abilities 
they may be willing to effectively sponsor the careers of individuals to whom they are connected. 
However, we expect that the effect of such sponsorship on an individual's career performance to 
lag behind their entry into the industry. That is, the career benefits of sponsorship will not be 
immediately felt, because sponsors will need to form an evidence-based judgment of an 
individual's abilities and this will take some time. In other words, show business family 
descendants must demonstrate to their sponsor's evidence of acceptable performance attributes by 
serving a convincing early-stage career apprenticeship. Accordingly, we suggest that stronger 
positive effects relative to direct nepotism on a show business family members’ career but they 
are likely to occur in the later stages of the sponsored individual’s first decade in the industry.  
Hypothesis 2: network sponsorship will have a positive effect on show business family members’ 




2.2.3. Differential gender effects of sponsorship on show business family 
members career outcomes  
Because evaluating creative talent is ambiguous, scholars have noted a dark side to network-based 
industries recruitment processes which show a tendency to discriminate between individuals based 
upon descriptive characteristics regardless of talent (Di Maggio & Garip, 2012). In many 
industries, such discrimination is based on gender. Qualitative studies of the UK movie and TV 
industry study finds that white, middle-class men typically have an advantage in accessing sought-
after jobs. Female professionals, as well as members of ethnic minorities, are less likely to secure 
preferred jobs (Grugulsi & Stoyanova, 2012). 
Similarly, the persistence of gender inequalities in project-based labor markets is well established 
(Lincoln & Allen, 2004). In the Hollywood movie industry females are subject to double jeopardy 
based on their gender and age, and are foremost amongst others in fostering exclusion and 
premature career failure (Lincoln & Allen, 2002).  In the context of organizational career 
promotion Burt (1998:13) suggests that women ‘pose a puzzle’ for the theory of brokerage forms 
of social capital  because ‘the entrepreneurial networks of men that are connected to early 
promotion do not work for women’ and with respect to early promotion ‘women do better with a 
small network of interconnected contacts’. However, female participation in closed networks are 
detrimental to their longer-term careers for two reasons: first females’ closed networks are often 
comprised of strong ties among same-sex network relationships. This creates a disadvantage 
because members of such network, in turn, tend to be 1) lower in status and 2) consist of fewer 
connections to important sponsors (Ibarra, 1992). As characterized by Burt (1998), female clique 
are closed networks with high redundancy, while they create social and emotional support they 
provide minimal information and control benefits and are associated with worse career 
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performance outcomes. This finding is echoed in the family business literature where gender 
discrimination is also evident with markedly lower rates of female succession to family business 
(Overbeke et al., 2013). Similarly, in the Hollywood context Lutter (2015) finds that females 
encounter a closure penalty, encountering severe career disadvantages when embedded in closed 
networks. Specifically, Lutter finds that female actors have a higher risk of career failure than their 
male colleagues when affiliated with cohesive networks. However, females have better survival 
chances embedded in open, diverse network structures. 
In contrast, Burt’s suggestion that women do not typically benefit directly from forming their 
brokerage ties but do so through their strong ties to established sponsors. Burt reasons that females 
tend to benefit more from a hierarchical and extended network of a sponsor as it enables the 
individual to ‘borrow’ social capital. Burt describes such networks as hierarchical where ties are 
sustained jointly by an actor and sponsor. Structural holes are borrowed from sponsor to provide 
second-hand information control benefits to the actor. The hierarchical nature of this relationship 
could be understood as a form of patronage. 
Hence, to the extent that females tend to embed in homophilous (same gender) close networks, 
their career is likely to suffer a closure penalty. However, we reason that the effects of female 
members of show business families’ tendency to seek social support in closed nonfamily networks 
will be mitigated by their embeddedness in an industry-specific show business family network. 
The pre-existing relationships of such families can better provide a readily accessed source of 
sponsorship. Based upon Burt’s gender logic, we reason that while males tend to form their open 
brokerage networks to advance their careers, female members of show business families are 
benefit more profoundly from sponsorship opportunities than males. In this way, sponsorship 
effects in show business families foster career performance equality between female and male 
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family members. Hence, we propose a positive moderating effect of network sponsorship on the 
career performance of female members of show business families.  
Hypothesis 3: network sponsorship has a stronger positive effect on female descendants’ career 
performance. 
2.3. Methodology  
For this analysis, we draw our data from Hollywood archival information in the IMDb, an 
online database containing information about Hollywood movies and the cast of performers and 
associated functions credited in each production. We selected this database for three reasons. First, 
there is sufficient data to identify individuals who have relatives listed on the database. Hence, we 
may differentiate between the careers of individuals benefiting from family support and those with 
no immediate family in Hollywood. Second, available data allows for the evaluation of an 
individual’s career performance over time and with objective performance measures. Third, 
Hollywood is representative of high risk, entrepreneurial environment where, since the advent of 
the blockbuster strategy has become a defining element of the industry.  The increased risk within 
the sector, as well as the prevalence of SPOs as the principal employers within the business, has 
resulted in a boundaryless environment in which participants must function in a series of 
independent projects.  Thus, the project-based nature of work in Hollywood allows for accurate 
measurement and analysis of the periods of employment and career outcomes. The sample for this 
paper consists of individuals employed in Hollywood as part of the core crew of a filmmaking 
project. The core crew is consists of a production’s actors, actresses, producers, directors, writers, 
editors, cinematographers, production designers and soundtrack composers. (Cattani & Ferriani, 
2008; Goldman, 1983). 
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Our sample consists of individuals whose careers started no earlier than in 1960 when the structure 
of the industry moved away from the vertically integrated studio system toward its contemporary 
network form (Miller & Shamsie, 1996). Secondly, an individual’s careers must span at least ten 
years with a minimum of three production credits. Finally, we exclude individuals who have 
encountered more than two years of inactivity or unemployment within the nine-year period. Thus, 
we exclude individuals with short-term or sporadic Hollywood careers 
Within this sample, we identified individuals with at least two family members who have enjoyed 
Hollywood careers, which we defined as a show business family. Among the subgroup, we filtered 
those whose incumbent family members have decision making roles such as producer and director 
role(s).  This process resulted in a sample of 228 individuals who have benefited from direct 
nepotism. Secondly, to identify the sponsored subset of individuals, we identified individuals who 
have a producer or director credits who have cast both a show business family and that individuals 
another member of his or her family (e.g., Stephen Spielberg casting Chet Hanks). The subset 
consists of 432 individuals with sponsorship support within the first ten years of their career. Our 
control group includes of 467 randomly selected Hollywood core crew individuals with ten years 
and three films within the industry and with no family member with performance credits in the 
industry. We collect career performance data for all of the 1127 individuals in the three groups. 
We use a simple moderation model, where the recipient gender moderates the relation between the 
types of support received from the family (direct nepotism or indirect sponsorship) on the 




2.3.1. Measures  
Our dependent variable is an individual's career performance which we measure in two ways. The 
first performance measure is a quantity indicator consisting of the absolute number of productions 
in which an individual is cast in core crew role. The second measure seeks to capture the quality 
of the production in which an individual is cast in a core crew role and consists of the average 
IMDb rating of the movies. IMDb movie productions are ranked by several industry experts on a 
scale from 1 to 10, where 10 indicates superior quality. We measured career performance in four 
time periods: first, we measure career performance over a full decade, i.e., ten years. To capture 
the temporal differences in this performance we calculate career performance in three equal 
periods (1) from the beginning of one’s career in Hollywood to the end of year 3, (2) from the 
beginning of year 4 to the end of year 6, and (3) from the beginning of year 7 to the end of year 9. 
The average of individual ratings forms a movie rating for each period. Although a movie is the 
outcome of a collective effort, we assume that being cast in a higher quality movie is indicative of 
superior career performance. Conversely, employment in low ranked productions is indicative of 
inferior career performance.  
Our primary independent variable is a categorical measure reflecting the type of family support an 
individual has received. We distinguish between three types of support in the following manner: 
1) No nepotistic support, individuals with no family support in the industry, 2) Direct nepotism, 
individuals who have been cast in the core crew role in the film directed or produced by family 
members and, 3) Indirect nepotism or sponsorship, individuals who have been cast in a core crew 
role by a director or producer who has also cast another family member. To test hypothesis three 
we employ gender as a moderating variable. We selected gender as a moderator in our study 
because there is much evidence of gender disparities that advantages males and disadvantages 
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females (van Emmerik 2006; Ibarra, 1992; Lutter, 2015; Grugulis & Stoyanova, 2012) and we are 
interested in understanding whether family support might mitigate female disadvantage interested.  
Control variables. Reflecting accumulated experience we expect age to have a positive effect on 
an individual’s career performance. Accordingly, we control for the impact of age in year one of 
an individual's Hollywood career. Except for female actresses, we expect career performance to 
increase with age as individuals accumulate industry-specific experience and extend their 
networks, which in occupations defined by boundaryless careers become vital assets in advancing 
one's career (Jones, Borgatti, & Walsh, 2003). We also controlled for the number of times 
individuals have worked with families because this can be conceived as the intensity of direct 
nepotism.  
2.3.2. Analysis 
To analyze our data, we use Stata 15 to perform ordinary linear squares (OLS) regression, 
which allows us to test the linear relationship of categorical independent and moderator variables 
on scalar dependent variables to determine whether various groups are significantly different 
regarding means in certain variables, after controlling for covariates. 
We tested for outliers using box-plot graphs, and we omitted the identified outliers from the 
sample. Therefore the final sample contains some 1116 individuals. Table 1 presents the 
correlations among the variables, the means, and standard deviation. A key underlying assumption 
of the ordinary linear regression is the absence of heteroscedasticity of the residuals. This means 
that the variance of errors should be homoscedastic and if the assumption is violated the coefficient 
estimated by the model will be biased and not reliable.  To check for heteroscedasticity, we 
performed the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity for all models. Which 
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indicated the problem of heteroscedasticity of the residuals (x2 = 296.53; p-value = 0.000). 
Therefore, we use robust standard errors in our OLS estimations. For scale variables, we calculated 
Pearson’s bivariate correlation. We calculated the point-biserial correlation between gender (a 
dichotomous variable, coded as “1” for men and “0” for women) and other scales variables. We 
analyze the dependent variables with OLS regression with three different support types (no support 
vs. direct nepotism vs. indirect nepotism). In addition to testing performance in three periods, we 
also report overall performance across the whole nine-year period. 
2.4. Results: 
Table 1 report descriptive statistics including means, standard deviation, and correlations. To test 
for multicollinearity, we computed the variance inflation factor (VIF) among the variables 
(Gujarati, 1995). Multicollinearity is not a serious concern as the highest VIF calculated does not 
exceed 1.49 (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). 
-Table 1 about here - 
Table 2 and 3 contains the results of OLS regression analysis for the first and second career 
performance measure. Table 2 pertains to quantity the number of productions in the first decade; 
Table 3 contains the results of the regression analysis in our second measure of performance, the 
average rating of movies that in which individuals appered.  
- Tables 2 about here-– 
-Table 3 about here- 
  
Hypothesis one (H1) states that direct forms of nepotism will have a weaker effect on career 
performance compared to indirect nepotism, i.e., Sponsorship forms of social capital. The test of 
H1 is the coefficient is the size, significance, and direction of the coefficients of direct nepotism 
27 
compared with indirect nepotism in model 1 of tables 2 and 3. Individuals with no family support 
are the baseline. Table 2- model 1 one provides strong support for H1 showing that members of 
showbiz families who are beneficiaries of nepotism has a significant but weaker effect size (β= 
2.622; p<0.001) compared to indirect (β= 5.436; p<0.001). Over the full decade, the effect size of 
sponsorship upon the number of roles is double the effect size of direct nepotism. Models 3, 5, and 
7 in table 2 all show that sponsorship has a larger effect size at every interval of the decade, which 
confirms the superior effect of sponsorship. About the quality of movies, Table 3, model 1 shows 
that over the full decade direct nepotism has a significant but weaker effect size (β= .942; p<0.001) 
compared to sponsorship (β= 1.074; p<0.001). That is, the direct effect of sponsorship is greater 
than that of direct nepotism but only marginally superior. Interestingly, the quality effect is evident 
in the first and second three-year intervals, but in the final three intervals, direct has a stronger 
effect size on the quality of movies in which an individual is cast. On balance, the effect size for 
sponsorship is stronger for the number of projects compared to the quality of the project over the 
first decade of one's career.  
Hypothesis two (H2) is a temporal hypothesis suggesting that the positive effect of sponsorship 
will be more evident in the later stages of a show business family members career. This is because 
indirect nepotism, i.e., sponsorship requires that individuals demonstrate their competence in their 
early stages. The test of H2 is the coefficient of the size, significance, and direction of the 
coefficients of indirect nepotism in models 3, 5 and 7 of tables 2 and 3. The data also support H2 
regarding the quantity of roles a showbiz family member appears. We confirm in all the models 
the effect of sponsorship upon the number of movies in which an individual appears, but the effect 
size is larger in the long run.  
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As for the control variables, we can see a significant positive effect for the times worked with 
relatives over all the eight models. The result is very logical as the higher the number of movies 
one plays with their relatives, the higher the overall number of movies on their resume. 
Interestingly, for the number of relatives in the industry, a consistent negative significant relation 
with the number of movies was found. This finding suggests that show business families' social 
networks are not necessarily scalable and that a family must divide its stock of social capital among 
more family members. 
Contrarily, the results in table 3 show that there is no consistent significant effect between the 
number of relatives and the quality of movies and in the same manner the number of times one 
worked with their relatives doesn't seem to have a consistent effect of the quality of movies. 
Regarding the quality effect of sponsorship provide less support for H2. Models 3, 5 and 7 
depicting the effect sponsorship over three periods are all highly significant (model 3: β= 1.016, 
p<.001), (model 5: β=1.126, p<.001) and (model 7: β= 1.015, p<.001). The finding suggests that 
individuals from show business families do not need to demonstrate an initial period of merit to 
be cast in better quality movies. In this case, sponsorship has a positive quality effect suggesting 
that sponsorship may provide an effective ‘launch pad’ for a show business family members early 
career enjoying significantly superior access to quality movies from the outset of his or her career. 
Hypothesis three (H3) our gender moderation prediction that specifies that sponsorship will have 
a stronger positive effect on female descendants career performance. The test of H3 is the 
coefficient of the size, significance and direction of the coefficients on the interaction term PMN 
x Male in model 2 in tables 2 and 3. Note that a positive coefficient indicates that females benefit 
more from sponsorship than males. The results in tables 2 and three provides strong support for 
H3, that is, female members of show business families enjoy superior quantitative (table 2, model 
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2: β= 0.54, p<. 01) and qualitative career performance (table 3, model 2: β= 0.654, p<.001) Over 
the first decade compared with males). The positive effect of sponsorship on female career 
performance is stronger for the number of movie roles in the later stages of the first decade but is 
consistently positive across all the stages regarding quality. These results data provide strong 
support for our H3. 
-Figure 2 about here- 
 
To better interpret the moderation effect we plotted the relationship between receiving family 
support and performance in Fig.1. High support in calculated by adding one standard deviation to 
mean (M+1 std) and respectively low support is mean minus one standard deviation (Dawson, 
2014). We tested for the linearity of the relationship. Figure 2 shows that gender positively and 
significantly moderates the relationship. 
2.5. Discussion 
Our hypotheses and supportive results suggest that both direct and indirect forms of nepotism are 
thriving in Hollywood with a significant impact on their beneficiaries regarding the number and 
quality of films in which they participate. We pay particular attention to the role of third-party 
network sponsorship, which we have labeled indirect nepotism since preferment by third parties 
is unlikely to be based on simple altruism or direct nepotism instead, we expect that it   is based 
upon the observation of meritorious competence in an industry where assessments of merit are 
often ambiguous. To summarize: we find strong support for our hypothesis that sponsorship, or 
indirect nepotism, will have a greater impact on career outcomes compared with direct nepotism 
(H1). The effect is especially strong regarding the quantity of measure of career outcomes, but the 
effect is also strong regarding the career quality measure, in which the effect of direct nepotism is 
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slightly stronger in the final three years of the first decade. We also find strong support for our 
temporal hypotheses that the strength of sponsorship effects will increase over time (H2), thus 
allowing sponsors to assess the true potential of a family member. This effect is especially strong 
for the quantity measure of career performance. Regarding the career quality measure, sponsorship 
increases between the first and second measurement periods declining slightly in the final period 
of the data. Finally, we find very strong support for our hypotheses that sponsorship has a stronger 
effect on women's career outcomes. The effect is especially strong and significant on the quality 
measure of career outcomes. Sponsorship is only insignificantly different from men's career 
outcomes on the quantity measure in the first three years of the performance career, a finding that 
is consistent with hypothesis two, namely that the sponsorship effect is weak in an individual’s 
early career. 
 With the sole exception of acting where underage children are employed, such as Drew Barrymore 
in ET for all other Hollywood roles, such as director, producer, editor, writers or composer, 
aspirants must be adults and show evidence of an ability to undertake the specific work that they 
seek. Thus, most Hollywood professions require years of experience to develop the necessary skills 
and enable individuals to build social capital. As such, in the first three years of individual’s career 
will be given to skill building, with industry participants essentially serving as paid apprentices.   
Our paper contributes primarily to the question of how business families practise nepotism by 
promoting their descendant’s careers. Theoretically, we contribute to the family business literature 
by distinguishing between two forms of nepotism and explain the underlying mechanisms in each. 
Our focus on business families, beyond the tangible and operational operating family firm, opens 
up the field of family business studies to a much wider range of phenomena, including the idea of 
the enterprising family in the field of professions and in network industries, where individuals 
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pursue boundaryless careers in a sequence of single project organizations. Here we emphasize the 
importance of the social evaluations literature (Bitektine, 2011) for understanding the practise of 
nepotism in assessing show business family members suitability for employment and shaping 
careers outcomes. Based upon our social evaluations arguments, we expected that social evaluators 
would consider direct nepotism (hiring descendants in the business families’ productions) 
illegitimate therefore encourage business families to avoid the practise of direct nepotism. While 
we find support that direct nepotism is weaker than sponsorship forms of social capital, but it is 
nevertheless the case that direct nepotism remains a strongly significant determinant of career 
performance at all stages of an individual's first decade in the industry.  
Relatedly, we find an additional temporal or sequencing effect in the practice of indirect nepotism 
in show business families. Sequencing effects of direct nepotism have been faintly observed in the 
labor economics literature concerning the strong intergenerational transmission of economic 
status, where research finds that father's nepotistic effects on children's career outcomes is 
especially strong for their sons in their early 30s (Corak 2013). Our results show that recipients of 
direct nepotistic support enjoy better performance from the outset regarding the quality of the films 
in which they appear. Moreover, this ‘better quality’ effect persists through the first decade of 
showbiz family members' career. The finding adds nuance to how show business families practice 
nepotism. It suggests that members of show business families enjoy superior access to ‘better’ film 
projects. Hence, these business families enjoy competitive advantages over individuals without 
industry relatives by helping descendants to accelerate their progress from the periphery to the 
core of this networked industry. 
The persistence of nepotism and sponsorship effects suggest an interesting dynamic that underpins 
show business families’ competitive advantage.  As an informal or ‘fictive corporation’ (Bellow, 
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2003) kinship advantage may play a central role in the long-term success of show business families 
and their networks.  We speculate that show business families may demonstrate a greater 
willingness to lend social capital, which we presume is reciprocated. Given the nature of the 
boundaryless career environment in Hollywood and the industry macro-culture, the reciprocal 
granting and receipt of preferred roles must be a highly valued practice.  Consistent with 
Jaskiewicz and his colleagues (2013) theorization of ‘good’ or reciprocal nepotism, established 
show business families’ members may achieve a position where reciprocal sharing of social capital 
can benefit all willing and able family members.   
The second contribution is to address the issue of gender inequities that are especially prevalent in 
boundaryless careers. Our contribution here is to examine the potentially beneficial effects of 
family support on women’s career performance. Our data strongly support the elevated 
sponsorship effect on women’s career performances. The effect is particularly strong for the career 
performance quality metric suggesting that show business families can use their social networks 
to improve women's casting in better quality films. Interestingly, women also benefit from direct 
nepotism, especially in the second three years of their careers on the quantity measure of career 
performance. Indeed, the joint effects of direct and indirect nepotism on show business family 
women’s career performance are such that they almost achieve parity with men, as evidenced by 
the near equality in the number and quality of films on which they appear.  This development 
would seem to indicate that women who manage to break into the industry and develop skills s are 
eventually accepted and likely build a stock of social capital. Hence, our findings suggest that 
show business families can mitigate one of the most notorious and long-standing inequities in the 
industry. Some readers may aver that nepotism is unfair and discriminates against outsiders. This 
may be so, but in the particular case of women, this inequity gives rise to new forms of equality. 
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Whether this beneficial family effect is replicated beyond Hollywood in other networked industries 
and in professions with associated boundaryless careers remains to be investigated. Recent 
research on power-couples, which are couples where both spouses have college degrees, finds 
family career outcomes may have geographic and sequencing components. For example, research 
finds that geographically mobile couples seeking employment in small cities with fewer 
employment opportunities for both partners, women tend to follow men to benefit from the male’s 
superior earnings potential (gender salary gap), which means women may settle for sub-optimal 
employment opportunities and this will reinforce career disparities (Sorenson & Dahl, 2013). 
Indeed, this effect is strongest among power-couples with young children. Thus, women’s careers 
in these settings may fall behind their spouse at a critical point in their career development. 
However, other research finds that power-couples tend to migrate to large metropolitan areas to 
ameliorate the problem of co-location in small cities with fewer opportunities (Costa & Kahn, 
2000). Other research finds that there are higher rates of power-couple formation in large 
metropolitan areas (Compton & Pollack, 2007). Hollywood, situated in the heart of the greater Los 
Angeles region, fits this geographical pattern. Here, we find that nepotism and sponsorship in show 
business families have a particularly strong effect on equalizing gender career inequities by helping 
women identify career opportunities at a relatively early stage of their careers, and we find that 
this effect intensifies over a full decade.      
 The generalizability of our results is undoubtedly a matter of interest for other professions and 
careers beyond Hollywood. Women encounter discrimination in other professions, such as 
medicine, law, and consulting, and whether multigenerational professional families have 
comparable effects remains to be investigated. Bellow (2003) suggests that kinship strategies that 
favor both men and women may indeed be growing in the post-industrial economy when he states 
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that ‘“we seem to be witnessing the formation of a series of professional enclaves dominated by 
networks of established families… these families do not monopolize their field as in the manner 
of medieval guilds, but they do employ dynastic strategies used by prior generations, and their 
offspring have advantages of access and opportunities that others do not have (2003: 460). Further 
research is warranted. 
Third and finally, we contribute to understanding the role of kinship networks in globally 
competitive industries. The gradual breakup of the Hollywood studio system, culminating in the 
1960s, and the emergence of a network form of industry organization foreshadows developments 
in many contemporary knowledge-based industries. Hence, Hollywood is indicative of the 
potentially valuable role of kinship-based sources of competitive advantage. Transactions cost 
theory of family firm competitive advantage suggests that managerial and family governed 
enterprises enjoy a unique comparative advantage in cultivating particular kinds of assets relative 
to one another: specifically, families enjoy an advantage in developing and leveraging their social 
capital and relational assets while managerial governed enterprises enjoy advantages with 
knowledge- and capital intensive assets (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). The differential advantages 
often manifest in the hybridization of corporate forms that are organized to benefit from asset co-
specialization. For example, in the automobile industry, large public corporations, such as Toyota 
and GM, focus on large-scale manufacturing and global distribution, while, family firms specialize 
in operating networks of franchised automobile dealerships, where local knowledge and reputation 
are valued attributes best cultivated by business families. 
Similarly, in arts and cultural industries, large public corporations, such as Viacom, Sony, and  21st 
Century Fox,  enjoy a comparative advantage in large-scale financing and international distribution 
while business families curate personal aesthetic talents and cultural knowledge (Le Breton-Miller 
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& Miller, 2015). This co-specialisation of assets is evident in the Hollywood movie industry and 
has produced a hybridized managerial-family enterprise macro–structure that has achieved a long-
lasting international competitive advantage. Thus, our study suggests that the enterprising business 
family enterprise constitutes a highly flexible organization form which can permeate and adapt to 
the imperatives of the public corporation in globally competitive industries. In this regard, the 
kinship-based organization appears likely to persist as an adaptable organization form.  
The evident hybridization and adaptability of the family enterprise may have been veiled in 
shadows by the long-running and unresolved debates about a finding a common definition of the 
family firm. Happily, some family business scholars are now more accepting of the futility of the 
definitional debate and embracing the heterogeneity of business families around the world (Nason, 
Mazzelli & Carney, 2018). We suggest that research into ‘families in enterprise,' evident in 
phenomena such as show business families, represents for family business scholars a potentially 
rewarding departure to fresh woods and pastures new. This is because kinship strategies can be 
vital to an industry’s functioning and competitiveness. We suggest that asset co-specialisation and 
hybridization of managerial and kinship forms of organization warrant further attention across a 
variety of knowledge-based industries and professions. 
A brief note on the study's limitations: one explanation for the strong effects of show business 
families’ impact on their descendants’ careers maybe partially attributable to unobserved variables. 
In particular, we theorized that nepotism might manifest in the transmission of a broader ‘package’ 
human, social, and cultural capital. While we have measured and accounted for the effects of social 
capital, in the form of direct nepotism and sponsorship, on career outcomes we were unable to 
observe the transmission of human and cultural capital, for example, as transmitted in the form of 
tacit knowledge.  Indeed, Jaskiewicz and his colleagues (2013) distinguish between ‘good’ forms 
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of nepotism in the shape of reciprocal exchange of tacit knowledge and the bad or entitlement 
forms of nepotism. We reasoned that negative social evaluations of nepotistic practice presume 
entitlement forms of nepotism, but it appears most probable that show business families do 
transmit a broader package of family capitals, which have not been adequately captured in this 
study. Thus, further research on the transmission of career-enhancing skills and resources is 
warranted if we are to understand these career dynamics. 
2.6. Conclusion 
The ways in which business families can facilitate career success for their family members is 
under-investigated. There is growing recognition that in the arts and cultural industries, career 
incubation can be facilitated by business families capable of investing for the long term by 
providing a package of valued human and social capital skills (Bellow, 2003; Le Breton-Miller & 
Miller, 2015). We have investigated the phenomena of kinship strategies in the form of direct and 
indirect nepotism as a mechanism for helping descendants improve their career performance in an 
internationally competitive networked industry. Our paper provides much ground for future 
research beyond Hollywood in other industries, in the fields of direct and more indirect forms of 
nepotism in creative industries, boundaryless careers family firms, and gender discrimination. We 
propose that family business scholars will find fertile ground for future research by investigating 
multigenerational family involvement with corporate hierarchies, professions, as well as other 
fields of endeavor.  
Our hypotheses and supportive results suggest that both direct and indirect forms of nepotism are 
thriving in Hollywood with a significant impact on their beneficiaries regarding the number and 
quality of films in which they participate. We suggest that the two are beneficial and we see little 
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evidence of entitlement based nepotism that might generate negative evaluations by social 
evaluators. We suspect that the costs of negative, entitlement forms nepotism are prohibitively 
high and both show business families and their sponsors will forswear the use of such practices. 
In particular, we propose that nepotism in the form of sponsorship has become reciprocal and a 
recurrent process among core and established industry participants. 
Further, this form of nepotism likely benefits all parties concerned, including the descendants of 
show business families, especially women. Some readers may aver that nepotism is unfair and 
discriminates against outsiders. This may be so, but in the particular case of females, this inequity 
gives rise to new forms of equality. Our paper provides much ground for future research beyond 
Hollywood in other industries, in the fields of direct and more indirect forms of nepotism in 
creative industries, boundaryless careers family firms, and gender discrimination.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Elective Affinities? Intra-Profession Marriage, Borrowed Social Capital, and 
Career Outcomes 
3.1. Introduction 
There is a growing tendency toward intra-profession-marriage in a wide range of sectors (Bellow, 
2003). These trends are evident in research on celebrity-couples (Parmentier, 2011), power-
couples (Compton & Pollak, 2007) and dual-career couples (Sorenson & Dahl, 2016). One view 
of the contemporary suggests that family is increasingly governed by the logic of individuality; a 
relationship based on elective affinities, where the association of individuals entails shared 
interests, experiences, and plans to repurpose an established institution (Beck-Gernsheim, 1998). 
In Western popular culture, marriage is associated with romantic love. Historically, marriage has 
been used dynastically as an instrument to cement ties between families for political and economic 
purposes (Lisle-Williams, 1984; Padgett & Ansell, 1993). Indeed, when discussing the role of 
kinship in advancing family members careers, Bellow (2003) suggests a possible repurposing and 
resurgence in historical practice:  
“We seem to be witnessing the formation of a series of professional enclaves dominated by 
networks of established families... These families do not monopolize the field in the manner of 
medieval guilds, but they do employ dynastic strategies used by previous elites, and their offspring 
have advantages of access and opportunity that others do not enjoy.” (Bellow: 2003:460) 
We view intra-profession marriage as a form of reciprocal nepotism (Jaskiewicz, Uhlenbruck, 
Balkin & Reay, 2013), where each party may actively promote their partner’s career interests. 
Nepotism may be viewed as negative terms and considered illegitimate in the context of the 
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bureaucratic-rational organization, yet nepotism may also be seen in positive terms, to the extent 
that it promotes reciprocally beneficial social exchange. Specifically, marriage may be 
considered as a mechanism for pooling and sharing partners stock of social capital. The value of 
social networks and social capital as mechanisms for individual economic outcomes and career 
advancement is well established (Di Maggio & Garip, 2012; Granovetter, 1995; Seibert, 
Kraimer, & Liden, 2001). Concerning the functioning of social capital mechanisms, a significant 
contribution is Burt’s (2000) understanding of the workings of borrowed social capital, which 
occurs when an individual (Ego) is sponsored into a network by a higher status other (Alter)1. 
Such borrowing is valuable to men but is believed to be especially significant for women’s career 
outcomes (Burt, 1998). This is because women encounter bias in professional career settings and 
may compensate for this discrimination by borrowing network resources, often from a male 
social tie (Burt, 1998). Intra-profession marriage, a strong social tie-in Granovetter's terms 
(1973), may represent a matrimonial merger the conjoining of two pools of social capital. Intra-
profession marriage may enable both partners to borrow one another's pool of social capital for 
instrumental purposes, possibly to improve their access to professional career opportunities. 
However, the effect of marriage as a source of social capital within professional occupations has 
mostly been neglected in the academic literature, particularly concerning spouses working in the 
same industry.  
In this paper, we reason that shifting patterns of work and career structure, in response to a variety 
of economic and technological factors such as globalization and the growth of the knowledge 
                                                 
1 For clarity, the focal person borrowing social capital is referred to as “Ego” and his or her spouse who is 
lending social capital is referred to as “Alter”.   
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economy, is accentuating the importance of social networks and social capital as a means of 
‘getting a job’ (Granovetter 1985|2018). Specifically, we note that many contemporary labor 
markets are characterized by project-based organizations and boundaryless career environments 
(Arthur & Rousseau, 2001). In this setting, we consider the question of whether marriage is an 
elective affinity and may be reasonably viewed as a tool for building social capital.  
Project organizations encompass a range of temporary organizational forms that integrate 
specialized knowledge resources and occupational expertise for the performance of project tasks 
(Sydow, 2004). They are found in a wide array of sectors including arts and culture (e.g. 
publishing, TV video games, and movies), engineering (e.g. construction, transportation, urban 
renewal), professional services (e.g. accounting, advertising, architectural design, law, 
management consulting, public relations), and information technology and communications (e.g. 
software, computer hardware, multimedia). Careers in these industries often follow a boundaryless 
careers path, whose salient features include frequent movement between employers, market-based 
recognition of performance attributes, and the prevalence of extra-organization information 
networks (Sullivan & Baruch, 2009). In such environments, the accumulation of social capital is 
an essential determinant of career performance (Jones, Borgatti & Walsh, 1998).  
We argue that in project-based organizations settings, spouses’ accumulated social capital can be 
beneficially transferred between themselves to help one another to advance in the hierarchy of 
roles and to increase the number of projects in which each spouse is hired. We develop and test 
three hypotheses concerning this general premise, namely that: 1) Marriage benefits spouses by 
allowing Ego to capitalize on Alter’s accumulated social to increase Ego’s number of career 
projects as compared to the number of pre-marriage projects. 2) Marriage benefits spouses by 
allowing enabling Ego to capitalize on Alter’s accumulated social capital to ascend the industry 
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executive hierarchy by being hired in managerial roles. 3) Marriage disproportionately benefits 
women by enabling female Ego to capitalize on male Alter’s accumulated social capital such that 
gender bias can be overcome enabling female Ego’s increased involvement in projects and 
managerial roles (Burt, 1998; Bevelander & Page, 2011). 
  We test our hypotheses in the context of the U.S. film production industry (“Hollywood”), 
which is considered to be an exemplar of a boundaryless, project-based, and creative industry 
(Jones, Borgatti & Walsh, 1998). We employ data from the International Movie Database (IMDb), 
which contains career data points on 17,000 couples that have produced, directed or cast in US 
feature films. We select a sample of 1,168 married couples active in Hollywood between 1970 and 
2011. This timeframe is considered to be the new Hollywood Era (Thompson and Bordwell, 2003; 
Jensen and Kim, 2015), where the project organization became the dominant industry mode of 
film production. In this setting, industry participants are well aware of the value of social networks 
as a means of personal career advancement.  
The Hollywood’s macrostructure characteristics have been analyzed and defined such that, the 
absence of mobility from the industry periphery to its core has been clearly documented (Jones & 
Walsh, 1997; Cattani & Ferriani, 2008). However, there have been no long-term studies on the 
effect of family social capital (and specifically spousal social capital) on an individual’s entry into 
the US film industry and subsequent career performance, especially as it relates to female industry 
participants.  Our analysis seeks to remedy this gap with two contributions. First, we contribute to 
career management with improved understandings of the understudied effects of kinship strategies 
among spouses in the same field,  how such strategies utilize borrowed spousal social capital, and 
demonstrate how men’s structural network position can mitigate the effects of gender 
discrimination. Thus, we consider the pervasive issues of gender stereotyping in network-
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dependent industries (Beilby, 2009; DePater, Judge & Scott, 2014; Lincoln & Allen, 2014; 
Rudman & Glick, 1999). Secondly, we add to the understandings of Burt’s (1998, 2000) view of 
borrowed social capital through its impact on individual career outcomes in network-dependent 
industries, where individuals pursue boundaryless careers seeking performance roles in project 
organizations (Arthur, & Rousseau, 2001).  
3.2. Theory & hypotheses 
Social capital is considered a-value-producing-asset for its holders (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Lin 
(2017) regards social capital as an investment in social relations with the expectation of a return 
in the marketplace. Other scholars define social capital as a quality created between two people 
(Burt, 1998) and a significant determinant of career success (Burt, 2000). When these dyadic social 
relations are scaled, we observe that ties between individuals form various types of social network.  
Numerous studies find that high-quality social network facilitates access to information, resources, 
power, and favors to its constituents’ (Fukuyama, 1995; Ibarra, 1997; Kanter, 1977; Lin, 2001; 
Timberlake, 2005). In project-based labor markets, social capital creates access to valuable 
information and reduces search costs, positively affecting career development by helping 
individuals acquire new jobs, establish opportunities for future collaborations and form ties with 
others who provide social and emotional support (Lutter, 2015).  Briefly, social capital is 
understood as an intangible asset that is derived from connections between people by which they 
can directly or indirectly assist one another in terms of career advancement. This is the sense in 
which social capital will be used throughout this analysis to shed light on how the assets provide 
individuals to find new avenues for career advancement and success.   
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Nevertheless, social capital and the social networks consitutions’ differ according to the 
individuals within the network and the structure of their relationships with others. Hence, social 
networks can be strong and closed (Coleman, 1988) or diffuse and weak (Granovetter, 1973, 
2005). These differences generate different values. Closed networks are said to provide fewer 
informational advantages as number of connections are high, but have high levels of redundancy 
(Burt, 2000).  Still, closed networks can foster a greater sense of emotional support and trust among 
members, thereby increasing the level of exchange.  Alternatively, Granovetter (1973) makes the 
case that weak social networks provide better information and have greater career enhancing value, 
due to the fact that the individuals who comprise it are not closely associated and that they often 
bridge what Burt (1992) defines as structural holes.  As such, they will have access to information 
that is not readily available in a closed network.  
3.2.1. The size and quality of Alters social network 
How can an individual (Ego), benefit from the value available within a social network? Much 
depends upon the size and quality of others’ (Alters) social networks. First, some people have very 
broad social networks as far as they are connected to multiple others referred to as degree centrality 
(Freeman et al., 1991). Alters who have many ties may have multiple Alternative ways and 
resources to achieve goals. They are relatively advantaged compared to individuals with fewer ties 
(Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001). However, in addition to the sheer size of the network 
other characteristics determine valuable qualities of the social network. 
Secondly, numerous structural holes exist between different networks. Information tends to flow 
freely and fully within closed networks, but this information is less valuable because everybody 
has it. In contrast, information flows much more sporadically across structural holes and as such, 
information that flows between networks tends to be valuable and non-redundant. Considered to 
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be the most important source of value are individuals whose structural position is such that they 
can bridge structural holes between two unconnected social networks (Burt, 2000). Therefore, the 
ability to bridge structural holes enables information filtering creating advantage and power within 
and between networks.  Effectively individuals who can bridge structural holes have the ability to 
broker information. 
Thirdly, another dimension concerns the status, or hierarchical position of an Alter in a network. 
Status is “the hierarchical position of an actor within a social system.” Jensen & Kim (2015, p.1). 
Hierarchical social networks differ from non-hierarchical social networks in that much information 
flows through one or more central individuals known as Eigen centrality, within a hierarchical 
network, one of the individuals with connections to many other individuals in the network (i.e., a 
high-status network member) who also possesses brokerage opportunities. Burt (1998) proposes 
that hierarchical social networks lend themselves to the effective use of borrowed social capital in 
that a central individual, who controls information flows, has the status to lend social capital to 
lower status individuals so that they can benefit from the central individual’s position. Borrowing 
social capital from a high-status individual can be a very effective means for career advancement 
within an industry, organization or network.  Specifically, Burt (1998) considers the efficacy of 
borrowed social capital for women seeking career advancement.  He finds that women and younger 
men are typically considered as lower status members of organizations and networks.  Further, 
women will tend to benefit more from borrowed social capital given their lower status in most 
organizations and networks (Burt, 1998). 
Each of these social network characteristics, degree centrality, capacity for bridging structural holes, and 
Eigen centrality in a context of boundaryless careers are potentially valuable mechanisms to an Ego seeking 
career opportunity and advancement. Marriage as well as strong social ties, represent an opportunity for a 
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union between two previously unrelated social networks with potentially reciprocal beneficial effects. 
Hence, we reason that the quality of Alter’s social capital affects the career outcome of the Ego ex-post 
marriage. Accordingly, we evaluate the size quality of each spouse’s social network, defined in terms of  
degree centrality, capacity for bridging structural holes, and Eigen centrality. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that  
Hypothesis 1a: The number of social ties in Alter’s network will be positively related to the career 
outcome of the Ego post marriage.   
Hypothesis1b: The quality of social ties in Alter’s network will be positively related to the career 
outcome of the Ego post marriage.   
3.2.2. Sharing Social Capital through Marriage. 
In both traditional and boundaryless careers, women typically face discrimination regarding their career 
advancement. There are many reasons, including gender stereotyping and male and female selection 
choices in their social network formation. First, stereotypes about women are remarkably 
consistent across cultures and have remained relatively stable over time.  These stereotypes cast 
women as more gentle, caring, nurturing, and or communal than men.  On the other hand, men are 
labeled as more assertive and competitive, or agentic (Carli & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Kite, 1993; 
Williams & Best, 1990).  Given these stereotypes, women face two challenges with respect to 
managerial positions.  First, they are viewed as not having the requisite characteristics to be 
effective managers, which are largely seen as masculine.  Second, if they act in a more agentic 
manner, they are often seen a deviant and non-feminine (Rudman & Glick, 1999; Eagly & Karou, 
2002). While attitudes, although not necessarily stereotypes, toward women have changed over 
time and became more favorable, perceptions of managerial characteristics or managerial 
stereotypes have remained relatively static, with an overwhelming skew toward masculine traits 
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being viewed as managerial by both men and women (Eagly, 2007; Powell, Butterfield & Parent, 
2002; Williams & Best, 1990).  Despite the fact that women are viewed more favorably than men 
and have been shown to be effective managers, stereotypes persist about the fundamental 
incompatibility of female characteristics and requisite management traits (Powell, Butterfield & 
Parent, 2002). Thus, while societal attitudes toward women and female characteristics may be 
changing, there appears to be a strong bias against women on the part of both males and females, 
especially when it comes to management positions. 
Secondly, regarding male and female preferences for network formation, both men and women 
also exhibit a preference for homophilous network choices (Mouw, 2003). Homophily is the 
tendency for individuals to form groups with others who share common characteristics such as 
gender, race, educational level or socioeconomic status (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). 
However, the effects of homophilous network preferences on career outcomes differ between male 
and females. White middle-class men, often enjoy superior stats, tend to have much more powerful 
social networks and greater social capital than do women and minority groups.  Women, who are 
effectively excluded from many social networks comprised of men, tend to also exhibit homophily 
and associate more closely with each other (Aldrich, Reece, & Dubini, 1989). 
Given that women tend to have lower status jobs, the resulting social networks that they form 
prone to be less powerful than those of men (Groysberg, 2010; Ibarra, 1992).   Given the 
importance of information that flows through a social network for career advancement; women 
often do not have access to same high-quality information as men, which limits career 
opportunities (Lutter, 2015).  To compensate for their social network and social capital 
disadvantage, women often must seek a male mentor and borrow social capital from that sponsor 
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in order to advance in their careers (Burt, 1998).  Yet other research finds that that women often 
have difficulty finding male sponsors for myriad reasons (Groysberg, (2010; Lutter, 2015). 
However, with this hypothesis, we reason that some of the detrimental career effects of 
stereotyping and social capital dynamics may be diminished by marriage, especially in 
boundaryless career environments which differ from traditional careers. Indeed, the union of male 
and female social capital within-profession marriage in boundaryless careers environments may 
be considered to be reciprocally beneficial; that is a dynastic strategy producing synergistic effects 
for both spouses. First, due to the strength of the marriage tie, we propose that both spouses will 
be willing to lend one another social capital through sponsorship. This may be especially beneficial 
to women who typically have difficulty finding high-status male sponsors.  
Secondly, given the importance of social capital in securing projects both spouses will be interested 
in maximizing the size and quality of the social networks. Hence, with the contingent nature of 
temporary projects, the literature suggests that both spouses will be incentivized to look out for 
each other's interests. Research supporting the prior two propositions is to be found in the related 
field of dual career couples and power couples (defined as couples in which both spouses have 
college degrees and so overlapping but not identical to within-profession marriage). Research finds 
that power couples tend to migrate to large metropolitan areas to ameliorate the problem of co-
location where smaller cities have fewer opportunities for dual careers in the same field (Costa & 
Kahn, 2000). Other research found that there are higher rates of power couple formation in large 
metropolitan areas (Compton & Pollack, 2007). Indeed, in smaller cities with fewer opportunities 
for dual-career couples, women tend to follow men to benefit from the male’s superior earnings 
potential (gender salary gap), For example, the greatest symmetry occurs among couples with 
young children where the male partner accounts for significantly greater share of household 
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income (Sorenson & Dahl, 2013). Hence, boundaryless careers and project organizations are more 
likely to thrive in large urban areas with dense labor markets (Cassel, Thulemark & Duncan, 2018). 
Indeed, research documents the prevalence of boundaryless careers (Culié, Khapova, & Arthur, 
2014) and dual-career couples in industry agglomerations (Malecki & Bradbury, 1992) and the 
gender pay gap is smaller in more populous urban areas (Nisic, 2017). The location of the 
Hollywood movie industry within the Los Angeles agglomeration is indicative of these dynamics. 
With the importance of social capital and access to information in project-based industries such as 
Hollywood (Lutter, 2015, Jones, & Walsh, 1997) it seems natural that spouses in the same industry, 
especially the U.S. film industry, would seek to leverage their collective capital in order to improve 
their individual and spouse’s industry positions. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2. Alter’s social capital can provide greater access to higher status production 
management roles after marriage.  
3.2.3. Marriage and female progress up the boundaryless career hierarchy.  
With our two previous hypotheses, we have argued that the effects of marriage on social capital 
and social network dynamics with regard to sponsorship, homophily, and gender stereotyping, can 
improve both partners’ career performance. With this hypothesis, we argue a gender-specific 
rationale suggesting that marriage may beneficially help females break the glass ceiling to ascend 
the managerial hierarchy in boundaryless career environments. Our rationale incorporates the so 
far unconsidered elements of boundaryless careers in project organizations. In particular, we 
consider the risk associated with Hollywood film production projects and the capacity for senior 
project executives to evaluate the suitability of particular individualsfor senior production roles, 
when the relationship between individual career abilities and project outcomes are ambiguous. 
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Women face considerable barriers to employment and career advancement in the U.S. film 
industry due to the risk profile associated with bigger budget blockbuster projects. Project risk 
inhered in the industry’s reliance on social networks, social capital and the associated elements of 
reputation and status; effectively bar women from achieving senior project management positions 
(Bielby & Beilby, 2002; Grugulis & Stoyanova, 2012; Lincoln & Allen, 2004; Lutter, 2015).  
Women have less access to influential social networks and the valuable social capital that they 
command, due to the presence of homophily and therefore are at a distinct disadvantage in 
Hollywood (Lutter, 2015).  Added to this situation are the presence of gender stereotypes and the 
Blockbuster Strategy-driven risk inherent in most filmmaking, which further prohibits women 
from securing management roles in Hollywood (Lutter, 2015, Faulkner & Anderson, 1987).  The 
combination of these effects and factors has resulted in an environment in which women are largely 
absent from management and technical positions, are paid less, and exit the industry with a greater 
rate of frequency than men (Beilby & Beilby, 2002; Beilby, 2009; Lincoln & Allen; 2004). 
The risks associated with filmmaking are accentuated by studios pursuit of the Blockbuster 
strategy, which emerged in the 1970s in Hollywood, with the commercial success of films such as 
The Godfather, Jaws, and Animal House.  These films resulted in an environment in which 
filmmakers sought to produce movies that would generate in excess of $100 million in revenue 
(Baker & Faulkner, 1991). In the pursuit of blockbuster films, producers raise large amounts of 
capital in order to finance higher budget productions.  The rising budgets of major Hollywood 
productions, which now average more than $100 million, including marketing and distribution, 
resulting in a culture in which producers seek directors, actors, editors, cinematographers, and 
technicians with records of success (Faulkner & Anderson, 1987).  In theory, individuals who have 
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worked on successful productions in the past, or who have garnered major awards will draw 
audiences, provide quality work and reduce the risk of failure of a particular film. 
However, there is substantial ambiguity about the executive qualities needed to realize blockbuster 
outcomes. While the risk entailed in blockbuster film production might provide the appearance of 
a rational basis for recruitment, all quantitative evidence points to the fact that past production 
success of actors and actresses, or star-power, in no way predicts, nor provides any greater measure 
of certainty, with respect to the commercial success of a film or its profitability (De Pater, Judge 
& Scott, 2014).   A major television executive quoted by Beilby & Beilby (2012:P.22) stated 
bluntly that “all hits are flukes.”  
Beilby & Beilby (2012, P.22) also suggest that “when nobody knows anything, reputation is 
everything. In both film and television, those who make hiring decisions are risking millions of 
other people’s dollars. One way to demonstrate to the studio chief or the head of programming that 
you are maximizing financial returns with a minimum of risk is to point to the top-notch reputation 
of the writers you hire.”  Effectively, in bearing out the adage that no one ever got fired for hiring 
IBM, the film industry executives assume that reputation signals quality and therefore reduces the 
risk of commercial failure despite the fact that all evidence points to the contrary. Given the 
academic research on gender in Hollywood, which reveals the presence not only of homophily, 
but also that reputation and past success does not de-risk the film production process, it seems safe 
to concur with the researchers such as Beilby (2002) and Beilby & Beilby (2012), De Pater, Judge 
& Scott (2014), Eagly & Karau (2002), Eagly & Mladonic (1994), Grugulis & Stoyanova (2012) 
that gender stereotyping is often masked by an appearance of expediency and prudence in the name 
of risk management, but that it really hides an uglier reality of gender discrimination.  Given 
anecdotal evidence provided by Scalia (2017), Powdermaker (1950) and Chen (2018), who write 
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on the experience of such Hollywood stars as Maureen O’Hara and Natalie Portman, it could be 
further posited that the cultural norms that provide a mainstay of Hollywood functioning 
effectively condone, or even promote and institutionalize gender stereotyping as well as bias, 
within the industry.  
For women in Hollywood, the combination of all the effects listed above results in lower pay, 
shorter careers, and higher instances of industry exiting. Based on recent disclosures, particularly 
pertaining to the producer Harvey Weinstein, it also results in sexual harassment, especially 
directed at women who attempt to gain managerial roles in Hollywood, or who improve their 
status, which effectively threatens gender stereotypes that pervade the industry, or in an attempt to 
reinforce male-dominated social networks and to effectively keep much of Hollywood a closed 
shop.  The apparent prevalence of this type of behavior may be due to the fact that it falls within 
the code of cultural norms in Hollywood. Further, while there tends to be societal agreement that 
women make effective managers, often more effective than men (Eagly, 2007), gender stereotypes 
preclude women from senior production management roles (Eagly & Carli, 2004) and even 
discourage them from seeking such positions (Eagly & Mlandinic, 1994).  Within Hollywood, the 
subjective nature of the hiring process largely favors men because of homophily, and the 
perception that women are riskier hires (Bielby; 2009). 
Given the relatively hostile environment that women face in Hollywood, it becomes apparent why 
in this particular industry, they might tend to trust less and be more discerning in terms of the 
connections that they form, and the individuals from whom they borrow social capital.  These 
factors, in combination with the importance and value of family social capital (Gorji, Carney & 
Prakash, 2018) for all family members, would seem to naturally result in an increased reliance by 
women in Hollywood on social capital borrowed from family members or spouses. Numerous 
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studies of copreneurship and family social capital have shown the benefit of this type of pooled or 
borrowed social capital, both for the borrower and the lender. As such, it would be wholly natural 
for spouses in Hollywood to seek to lend and borrow social capital between them.  Further, given 
the environment in Hollywood, it would be natural for female spouses to place trust in their male 
spouses with respect to borrowing social capital. 
As stated, women face many obstacles in terms of closed networks, homophily, lower status and 
less social capital. However, they can disproportionately benefit from weak and diverse social 
networks (Lutter, 2015), especially by virtue of social capital borrowed from high status sponsors 
with Centrality (Burt, 1998, Freeman et al. 2001).  Given the necessity to carefully choose 
sponsors, it would seem natural that female spouses would place a high degree of trust on their 
male spouses and borrow social capital from them such that they would experience greater career 
advancement than unmarried women.  Thus, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: women benefit more from borrowed social capital by reaching higher status 
production management roles after marriage. 
3.3. Data & method 
The data for this analysis was drawn from archival Hollywood information contained in the IMDB, 
an online database providing data about Hollywood films, including cast, crew, directors, 
producers, editors and all associated individuals who participated in each production. The IMDb 
and Hollywood as an industry understudy were selected for three principal reasons: First, the IMDb 
contains sufficient information such that spouses in Hollywood can be identified as married (date 
of marriage, divorce, death are included, and help determine the duration of each marriage).This 
was important in order to evaluate the effect of marriage on ex-post career performance and 
53 
advancement. We use repeated event analysis history to model the sometimes-complicated 
marriage and divorce history of each individual. Secondly, Hollywood is considered to be a leading 
exemplar of a project-based industry and a boundaryless career environment (Lutter; 2015).  As 
such, the requisite data is available that is necessary to evaluate individual industry participants’ 
career performance over time and with objective performance measures.  
3.3.1. Sample 
This analysis used a sample size of 1,167 married couples who were active in Hollywood between 
the years 1970 and 2011. Married couples considered in this analysis had credits in a specified 
number of Hollywood film. Spouses are only considered and included in this study if they have a 
specified minimum number of film credits namely, three in a period of five years before being 
married, and actively continue working in the industry for at least three years after marriage. The 
spouses had to have been active for at least five years in the U.S. film industry before their nuptials, 
and at least one spouse had to continue working in Hollywood for at least three years after the 
marriage began. 
Further, only individuals who had worked as part of the core crew on a Hollywood film are selected 
for this analysis. The core crew consists of a production’s actors, actresses, producers, directors, 
writers, editors, cinematographers, production designers and soundtrack composers (Cattani & 
Ferriani, 2008; Goldman, 1983).  Given the boundaryless nature of Hollywood and the importance 
of social networks for the U.S. film industry, it was reasoned that only core crew members would 
have the necessary social capital to lend to a spouse in order to improve his or her career trajectory. 
We test our theory using 41 years of panel data on the Oscar winners and nominees.  We used the 
IMDB database that provides us with an affiliations data. Each individual is affiliated to a movie, 
which is also known as 2-mode or bi-modal network. However, 2-mode data sets are collected or 
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constructed explicitly as an intermediary step toward the construction of a 1-mode network data 
set, where we can measure degree and Eigen centrality. The raw data was downloaded from IMDB 
as a csv file. Following a lengthy data cleansing process, I used relational databases (My SQL) to 
link data with their attributes. As a result, a network was initially generated using MATLAB in a 
matrix format, containing several attributes such as gender, starting year, role, family ties... Due 
to the bid size of data analysis, to avoid several system crashes, R Studio was used to perform 
network analysis. 
A matrix of co-affiliation (individual-individual who are affiliated to movies) was generated for 
each year.  Using Statnet package in R, different measures of centrality and constraint. 
3.3.2. Dependent Variables 
We use two dependent variables to measure an individual's career performance. The first one is a 
simple quantity measure which is the absolute number of core crew roles in a film production. 
Since this measure is a count variable that is zero-inflated, the analysis was performed by using 
negative binomial regression. To determine the effect of marriage on career performance, panel 
data five years before and after the marriage were gathered. The time frame examined after the 
date of the nuptials was intentionally made shorter, in order to isolate the effect of marriage on 
each spouse’s career performance.  
The second dependent variable for this analysis is a categorical measure that examines any positive 
or negative change in roles with respect to the film hierarchy (i.e., moving toward or away from 
managerial roles). Role changes were categorized in three ways:  
Promote: movement from acting to producing/directing roles;  
Demote: movement from producing/directing roles to acting; and,  
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No change: staying in the same roles three years after as before marriage. This dependent variable 
is a categorical with more than two categories, a multinomial regression was employed.  
3.3.3. Independent Variables 
The primary independent variable is the size and quality measure of Alter’s social capital. For size, 
we measure Alter’s degree centrality. For quality, we use two measures: Eigen centrality and 
Burt’s Constraint. Effectively, these three tests measure Alter’s network centrality or status, the 
ability to influence others in a network, and the ability to bridge structural holes. Constraint 
describes the extent to which a person’s network is concentrated in redundant contacts (Burt, 
1992, Chap. 2). Constraint is high if contacts are directly connected to one another (dense network) 
or indirectly connected via a central contact (hierarchical network).To test Hypothesis 3, we 
performed all the analyses separately for each gender. Considering that there is much evidence of 
disparities that advantage males and disadvantage females (van Emmerik 2006; Ibarra, 1992; 
Lutter, 2015; Grugulis & Stoyanova, 2012), this analysis sought to understand whether or not 
marriage to another industry participant and access to the new spouse’s social capital could 
mitigate the existing disadvantages faced by female industry participants in Hollywood.  
Reflecting accumulated academic literature on the subject of social capital, this analysis expects 
borrowed spousal capital to have a positive effect on an individual’s career performance. 
Accordingly, this study controls the impact of experience at the time of marriage.  It also accounts 
for Ego’s structural position before marriage in order to examine career changes that result from 





To analyze the data, Stata 15 software was utilized to perform negative binomial regression and 
multinomial regression. If the outcomes are discrete count variables, then Poisson regression or 
negative binomial regression can be used. We picked negative binomial regression over Poisson 
due to its flexibility for data that reveals over-dispersion; Poisson distribution assumes that the 
mean and variance are the same. To measure centralities, we used R studio Version 1.0.143.  
"Constraint" command in the "igraph" library to calculate the ego-centric based constraint. To 
measure degree and Eigen centrality, we transformed a bi-modal network of actor-movies to a 
unimodal network of actor-actor. Using social network analysis packages in R studio we measures 
use cognitive social structure.  Table 4 presents the correlations among the variables, the means, 
and standard deviation.  
3.4. Results 
The results the data analysis performed in this study confirm certain of the hypotheses posited 
while also corroborating elements in the academic literature as it pertains to borrowed social capital 
and gender biases. The data analysis also provides some very interesting insights about the value 
of marriage for men and women, and the worth of their social capital as they relate to Hollywood. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1a) states that the number of ties in Alter’s network, i.e. Degree centrality, will be 
positively related to the career outcome of the Ego post-marriage. The test of H1 is the significance 
and direction of the coefficients of Alters degree in model 1 to 2 of tables 5. Table 5 illustrates the 
significant impact that Alter’s degree centrality has on the count of film projects in which Ego 
participates after his or her nuptials. Degree centrality measures the volume of ties connected to a 
node, which is calculated by summing the number of individuals with whom Alter has connections. 
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The statistical analysis shows that the relationship is significant for models 1 and 2, including fixed 
(0.0381, p < 001) and random effect (0.0398, p < 001). Effectively, the analysis shows that both male 
and female spouses benefit from marriage, and the added social capital and information flows that 
it bestows upon them in the form of more film production work.  This result is what was expected 
in that it confirms portions of Burt’s (1998) work on borrowed social capital, as well as (Gorji, 
Carney & Prakash, 2018) work on the value of familial social capital. Further, it also confirms the 
importance of social capital and access to networks for information and employment opportunities 
in boundaryless and project-based environments such as Hollywood (Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; 
Jones, 1996, Jones & Walsh, 1997; Jones Borgatti & Walsh, 1998). 
-Table 5 about here - 
Hypothesis 1 (H1b) states that the quality of the ties that exist in Alter’s network, i.e., Eigen 
centrality, will be positively related to the career outcome of Ego post-marriage. As a proxy for 
quality we use two measures: Eigen centrality and Burt’s constraint. Table 6 illustrates the 
significant impact that the quality of Alter’s network has on the count of film projects in which 
Ego participates after his or her nuptials.   
-Table 6 about here - 
The statistical analysis shows that the relationship is significant for models 1 and 2, including fixed 
(0.866, p < 05) and random effect (0.697, p < 05). We also used Burt Constraint. More constraint 
means more network closure, and so more social capital according to the closure argument. If 
network closure is the source of social capital, then performance should have a positive association 
with constraint. Table 7 shows that the effect of Alter’s Burt Constraint is significant for models 1 
and 2, including fixed (1.612, p < 001) and random effect (1.809, p < 001).  
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-Table 7 about here - 
These results seem to contradict without Burt’s (1992) theory about the value of structural holes 
in and between networks and not support Hypothesis 1b. Effectively, this element of the data 
analysis shows that more network closure in Alter’s network results in more valuable social capital 
to be lent to Ego, regardless of gender. In the project-based settings, in the movie industry, Alter’s 
closed network appear to provide valuable information that can benefit Ego.   
Hypothesis 2 states that Alter’s social capital can provide greater access to higher status roles and 
managerial opportunities than what is available to Ego before marriage. To test Hypothesis 2, we 
performed a multinomial logistic regression that tests changes in roles on the part of spouses after 
nuptials. Table 8 contains the results of the multinomial logistic regression. Effectively, the data 
analysis provides no support for the second hypothesis of this study.  
-Table 8 about here - 
Only gender (0.413, p <0.01) was found to be significant in the full model with respect to change 
in role. This finding contrasts our analysis’ original hypothesis that female spouses would 
potentially move to managerial roles as a result of the social capital that they borrow from their 
male spouses. Instead, that analysis showed no significant change in the role of female spouses 
once married. Rather, the data analysis shows that males are more likely to obtain managerial roles, 
such as directing, producing or writing once married, but also that Alter’s social capital seems to 
have no significant impact on the change of roles and moving higher or lower in the hierarchy. In 
this regard, this element of the analysis seems to contradict Burt’s (1998) findings pertaining to 
female career advancement as a result of borrowed social capital, likely from a male sponsor. 
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Hypothesis 3 suggests that women benefit more than men from borrowed social capital after 
marriage. Hypothesis 3 is tested in table 5-8. As for the size, the significance and direction of the 
coefficients of Alter’s degree in model 3 to 6 of tables 5, shows that Alter’s degree centrality is 
significant for both genders, for women the coefficient is (0.0339, p <0.001) in fixed model and 
(0.0374, p <0.001) in random model and for men (0.0418, p <0.001) in fixed model and (0.0422, 
p <0.001) in random model. The coefficient is slightly more significant for men.  
Table 6 model 3-6, provides interesting results and support for Hypothesis 3 in that the effect of 
Alter’s Eigen centrality is significant for females in model 3 (1.226, p < 0.05) and model 4 (1.018, 
p < 0.05) but not for males, Model 5 and 6. This indicates that females benefit more from marriage 
to males connected to higher status nodes in the network, than males who marry females with a 
lower status network. Thus, the findings in Table 7 bear out elements of Burt’s (1998) work on 
gender-specific borrowed social capital.  In addition, it seems to confirm Bevelander & Page’s 
work (2011) in that males appear to have higher status networks than females do. This finding 
provides partial support for 1b, but also support for Hypothesis 3. The results in Table 8 support 
Hypothesis 3 that female spouses disproportionately benefit from access to male spouses’ social 
capital and networks. Effectively, the data indicate that females find more employment, but not 
necessarily more work in management roles. This is not to state that there is no upward movement 
in female spouses’ career trajectories, but that it is less the case for women. 
3.5. Discussion 
The title of our paper poses the question of whether contemporary intra-professional marriage may 
be a type of elective affinity (McKinnon, 2010), an institution used materially to further the 
professional careers of two individuals. In this instrumental view, the family becomes an elective 
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relationship designed to realize the personal plans and interests of the constituent individuals 
(Beck-Gernsheim, 1998; Bellow, 2003). From this perspective, intra-professional marriage may 
be imagined as a dynastic strategy, a sort of sponsored recruitment and placement system 
specifically activated to realize mutual interests (Bellow, 2003). However, we note that theorists 
of dynastic intermarriage do not see a direct causal relationship between intermarriage and any 
specific material outcome, rather intermarriage is more often understood as an outcome or 
‘derivative of a certain social and moral cohesion’ (Lisle-Williams, 1998:335). Thus, intermarriage 
between the owners of London's Merchant Banking community was not expressly designed to 
create a powerful inner circle (Lisle-Williams), nor was intermarriage between Glasgow 
shipbuilders in Victorian Britain designed to limit competition (Ingrams & Liptshitz, 2005). In 
their study of the rise of the Medici family to economic and political domination of Renaissance 
Florence, Padgett & Ansell (1993) found that the Medici’s did not do business with families they 
intermarried. Political and economic goals were strictly segregated, and multiple overlapping ties 
were strongly discouraged. Indeed, in all of these examples, intermarriage is one of many 
correlates of an existing status hierarchy or social class order, rather than a strategic instrument. 
As Lisle-Williams (1984:336) puts it, intermarriage is better understood as a ‘derivative of 
historically prior forms of interaction based on common interests and cultural unity.’  
The Hollywood film production system has evolved in its own particular industry macro-culture, 
comprising status hierarchies or caste system (Perreti & Negro, 2006), with production conducted 
in project organizations and boundaryless careers (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008; Jones & Walsh, 
1997), along with a coterie of dynastic show business families (Gorji, Carney, & Prakash, 2018). 
In this macro-culture, the cultivation of social capital and social networks represent the 
epiphenomena that are necessary correlates of effective career management within the Hollywood 
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macro-culture.  It is from this perspective that we develop our discussion on the paper’s 
contributions. We first address the issue of the role of the intra-professional marriage in social 
networks and career performance. Secondly, we discuss some of the implications for the future of 
work, and thirdly, we consider the vexed persistence of gender inequities. 
3.5.1. Intra-professional marriage, social networks, and career performance 
A substantial literature has accumulated on the relationship between social networks, social 
capital, and career outcomes, especially in the context of Hollywood. We call attention to the 
seemingly incongruous role of kinship and marriage as a mechanism for career advancement. We 
say incongruous since progression up the professional career hierarchy in modern industries is 
thought to be an anachronism, and since career performance is expected to be based upon 
meritocratic criteria such as formal educational attainment, talent, ability, as well as a range of 
social and psychological competences. Preferment in rational-bureaucratic economic industries 
on the basis of kinship through nepotism and unmerited favoritism is generally associated with 
mediocrity. Nevertheless, we find that kinship is alive and well operating in the shadow of the 
globally competitive industries (Ingrams & Lipshitz, 2005). Recent research suggests family 
nepotism is endemic in the highest-paid jobs, for instance, Corak (2013) finds that 70% of the 
highest 1% of earners in Canada was currently, or have worked for their father employ or for 
their father's employer. We find much support for our hypotheses 1a and 1b that in the context of 
Hollywood, intra-professional marriage is associated significantly to an improved number of film 
projects for both genders. Specifically, our results show the aforementioned in the subsequent 
three years following marriage. Improved film numbers for both men and women are associated 
with a function of the spouses: 
 i) degree centrality, i.e., the size of their network,  
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ii) females, though not males, benefit significantly from their spouse’s network status, i.e., Eigen 
centrality 
iii) both male and females benefit through by the extent of their spouse's association with 
structural holes, ( measure by Burt’s constraint, more constraint means less strucutral holes).  
In other word, following an intra-professional marriage, both men and women benefit from the 
size and quality of their spouse's social network. To clarify, we are not suggesting that couples 
actively decide to marry to improve their career prospects. Instead, we suggest our findings 
represent a consequence of an epiphenomenon:  there are many ways of cultivating career 
enhancing social capital and social networks in Hollywood; marriage to a spouse with a sizable, 
high-quality network is one of them.  
3.5.2 Intra-professional marriage and the future of employment 
To the extent that Hollywood can be considered the leading exemplar of project-based organization 
and boundaryless careers representative of a range of contemporary professions, then our findings 
have implications that reach beyond Hollywood. Project organization are associated with flexible 
labor markets and the gig economy. One estimate suggests that 37% of working Americans engage 
in some type of freelance or project-based labor (Maguire, 2018).  
Based on the functioning of Hollywood, these figures indicate that social networks and social 
capital, as well as the associated assets of reputation and status, will become increasingly important 
determinants in gaining regular access to work. The implication is as we predicted in hypotheses 
1a and 1b, suggesting that dual-career couples will have greater advantage in finding regular work 
in these industries.  
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However, we find little support for hypothesis 2 and 3 regarding the role of social networks in 
advancing individuals career. Particularly, to progress upwards in the career hierarchy and into 
production management roles, our results suggest Alternative interpretations. 
In this regard, there are limits to what marriage can do. In hypothesis 2, we find that following 
marriage, males do experience promotion of the career hierarchy into production management 
roles, but this upward mobility is not explained by any of the explanatory variables in our paper: 
if males enjoy upward mobility. It does not appear to have anything to do with the size and quality 
of their spouse’s social network. Moreover, we find that females enjoy no comparable social 
mobility into production management roles. Naturally, hypothesis 3 predicts that spouses’ social 
network will have a greater impact on female career mobility is unsupported with our data. 
In particular, our logic for hypothesis 3 is based upon Burt’s 1998 paper on the gender of social 
capital. It suggests that females’ upward mobility in a corporate hierarchy benefits more from 
sponsorship, or borrowed social capital than from a high-status sponsor. 
However, Burt’s (1988) conclusions are drawn from a study conducted in a large US electronics 
firm, a formal bureaucratic organization. We suspect such well-established organizations are prone 
to social and economic pressures to adopt evaluation and promotion practices that are more 
favorable to female outcomes. Additionally, over the past 30 years, the number of women in 
managerial roles has increased as some organizations have come to value managerial diversity and 
female managerial attributes (Duehr & Bono, 2006). However, within the context of ephemeral 
project organizations, the establishment of female-friendly evaluation and promotion practices do 
not appear to be based upon corporate procedure but on industry-wide base cultures and accepted 
practices. It is quite possible that gender favorable programs have not yet diffused into such 
settings. 
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Consequently, there are no apparent safeguards for females concerning blatant gender bias. 
Unfortunately, it appears that in Hollywood the glass ceiling for women with respect to managerial 
roles appears to have thickened. Thus, the consequences in other project organization industries 
are not promising on the basis of the Hollywood precedent. Therefore, how more equitable career 
advancement strategies become normative within project organization-based industries remains a 
subject for future research. 
3.5.2. The vexed persistence of gender inequity 
The issue of rampant gender inequities in the Hollywood movie industry has recently attracted 
much public attention engendering a social movement to remedy injustice.   However, in addition 
to the phenomena of homophily and women’s tendency to self-select into lower status social 
networks, the dominant logic of the blockbuster strategy in Hollywood plays into the persistence 
of gender inequities in subtle but remedial ways. As noted above, producers and other executives 
seek to reduce the risk associated with the blockbuster strategy and women are typically considered 
as high-risk, which harms their ability to attain production management roles. However, that 
perception is simply based on the industry’s lore as there is little evidence to support the 
perception. Thus, the risk mitigation strategies of Hollywood executives appear to be built on a 
false premise. Certainly, academic research on the comparative performance of males and females 
with respect to the financial performance of Hollywood productions warrants further investigation. 
More generally, in other project-organization industries, we might reasonably expect to see greater 
diversity of strategies with different risk profiles. It remains an open question whether fare better 
in project-organization industries with more varied strategies. On a more positive note, Powell, 
Butterfield & Parent (2002) show that stereotypes and negative attitudes toward outgroups, such 
as women can and do change over time.  Again, given that Hollywood appears to be a harbinger 
65 
for the entire economy, the extent to which stereotypes of women in the U.S. film industry are, or 
can be changed, these findings would be of potential benefit for many other sectors of the economy. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Our study indicates that marriage between Hollywood industry participants and the potential for 
borrowed spousal capital that it creates benefits both parties. It demonstrates that the extent to 
which Alter has extensive connections, centrality, status, and dense and closed network; Ego will 
benefit in terms of more opportunities for employment.  In many respects, these findings confirm 
the work of Burt (1998); Granovetter (1973, 2005), Lin (2001) and Coleman (1990) with respect 
to the efficacy of social capital and the value of non-redundant information concerning certain 
types of social networks. However, we call attention to the role of kinship in facilitating the 
cultivation of social capital in an unexpected industry setting. 
Moreover, our study indicates the limits on the value of social capital for women as it pertains to 
career advancement to managerial roles in Hollywood and confirms the presence of gender 
stereotyping and homophily in the U.S. film industry.  Thus this study demonstrates that borrowed 
spousal social capital has value for women in project-based industries but only in terms of gaining 
more work, and not necessarily in terms of career advancement. This contradicts Burt’s findings 
(1998) in a more traditional industry setting. Whether these conclusions suggest that women 







Status shifts and spillover effects on family members of Oscar winners 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 The conferment of awards and prizes to individuals in recognition of their significant 
achievements is a central aspect of modern cultural and social life (Heinich, 2009). The more 
highly valued and respected awards span across different vocational endeavors including the 
sciences, like the Nobel Prizes and the Royal Society Copley Prize, the arts, like the Oscars and 
the Grammy Awards, and in literature, such as the Man Booker Prize and the Pulitzer Prize. These 
awards have a long tradition with the Copley Prize dating back to 1731 and the Nobel Prize first 
awarded in 1901. Moreover, individual achievement is also rewarded via membership of important 
and prestigious representative bodies such as the French Academy and the Royal Society; 
established respectively in 1635 and 1660.   
 The nature of prestigious awards and prizes as well as appointments to prestigious 
representative bodies means that there are very few winners and awardees for the large number of 
potential contenders and the small number of awards. As a result, highly deserving contenders may 
miss out on due recognition, even though they may be equally deserving. Dubbed the 41st chair, 
Merton (1968) outlined how equally deserving scientists, artist and writers are passed over for 
auspicious awards. Merton (1968) describes the 41st chair as a reference to those high achievers 
who did not become members of the French Academy (like Descartes and Zola), which is limited 
to 40 ‘immortal’ members. In many cases, the holder of the 41st chair is likely to produce work 
that is likely to be equally, if not more, prolific and influential.   
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 In and of itself, a prestigious award may not necessarily impact on the ongoing quality and 
output of award winners compared to non-winners. Nevertheless, Merton (1968) highlighted that 
award winners receive a significant status boost which may unsettle the system for future 
allocations of resources. Merton fully described this phenomenon as the Matthew effect wherein a 
winner of a prestigious prize or award continues to receive recognition for their ongoing work 
beyond perhaps its relative value, whereas non-winners receive less recognition for their more 
valuable contributions. According to Otner (2017), the Matthew effect is a “force of unacceptable 
inequality” (p. 1) such that a competitor who was awarded the last position (the 40th chair) qualified 
him or her for high status and received disproportionate advantages in terms of notoriety and 
allocation of resources compared with the near winner (the occupant of the 41st chair) who does 
not receive the status shift benefits of award recognition. Indeed, research has shown that people 
are biased toward more favorable judgments of high-status actors (e.g., Kim & King, 2014) and 
award them a disproportionate share of resources (e.g., Pettit, Sivanathan, Gladstone & Marr, 
2013), whereas lower status actors faced more stringent evaluations of their performance and 
received a lower allocation of resources.     
 Although it is not surprising that a positive status shift from winning an Oscar or a Nobel 
prize grants access to resources, opportunities and, a social identity that secures the winner’s place 
within the broader social and cultural system (Azoulay, Stuart & Wang, 2014). Research has 
highlighted some adverse status shock effects. For example, award winners have been shown to 
experience lower levels of collaboration after the conferment of a science prize (Chan Onder & 
Trogler, 2015), receive lower quality evaluations of award-winning books in literature (Kovacs 
and Sharkey, 2014), and Oscar winners are more likely to suffer negative effects in their personal 
and professional lives, such as divorce (Jensen & Kim, 2015). It is also the case that a positive 
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status shift may generate negative spillover effects to those closely associated with a prestigious 
award winner.   
 Indeed, recent work on positive status shifts has highlighted the effects of award 
conferment produces spillover effect to those closely associated with the award winner. In one 
direction, positive status shift has been shown to lead to negative spillover effects (Reschke, 
Azoulay & Stuart, 2017), wherein the conferment of a science prize appeared to divert attention 
away from works and actors in the vicinity of the prize winners’ professional neighborhood. In the 
other direction, positive spillover effects have been shown in the arts with Oscar awards (e.g., 
Rossman, Esperaza, & Bonacich, 2010) and in business (e.g., Aarstad, Haugland, & Greve, 2009) 
such that the benefits of status recognition to an individual spillover to a whole group of close 
neighbors or category of associates wherein the legitimacy of an area of work is endorsed and 
accentuated. It would appear that the contrasting spillover effects of positive status shifts across 
different professional endeavors are domain specific (Heinich, 2009); positive status shifts may 
produce negative spillover effects in the sciences but result in positive spillover effect in the arts. 
Nevertheless, how spillover effects relate to positive status shifts with reference to different 
domains of achievement is a relatively open research question.    
 The current study aims to address the question of whether or not positive status shifts 
generate spillover benefits to associates or near neighbors of award winners in the arts; specifically, 
winners of the prestigious Oscar award. Not surprisingly, the Oscars have real implications at the 
box office. Undeniably, the Best Picture laureate/winner earn significantly higher-grossing 
movies. (Nelson, Donihue, Waldman, & Wheaton, 2001). 
 Likewise, winning an Oscar can dramatically increase the status and ultimately the remunerations 
that a once-obscure actor or worker can demand as a result of their increased exposure and 
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recognition. What is less known, however, is how the positive status shift associated with an Oscar 
win may generate spillover benefits to those closely associated with the winner. Whereas there is 
some research to suggest positive spillover effects for professional associates of Oscar winners 
(Rossman et al., 2010), there has been no specific research on positive spillover effects among the 
family members associated with an Oscar winner. Anecdotal evidence would indeed suggest a 
positive spillover effect among family associates of Oscar award winners when one considers 
people like Francis Ford Coppola and Ben Affleck. Whether positive spillover effects to family 
members is the exception or the rule in this industry is the focal research question of the proceeding 
research reported here. To address this question, the career trajectories of family members 
associated with Oscar winners are empirically investigated in the current study.  
4.2. Theory and Research 
4.2.1. The Matthew Effect 
 Theory on the social and psychological impact of significant status shifts or ‘status shocks’ 
has benefited from the work and ideas of Robert Merton (1968). In his seminal paper “The 
Matthew Effect in Science,” Merton draws on the thoughts and experiences of Nobel laureates to 
advance theory on the effects of sudden status shifts on the advancement of ideas and the allocation 
of resources in the sciences. Merton describes the Matthew effect wherein a winner of a prestigious 
prize or award experiences a significant and positive status shift within their field of endeavor. 
Although this is not surprising, the Matthew effect occurs because winners continue to receive 
recognition for their ongoing work beyond perhaps its relative value. In contrast, non-winners 
receive less recognition for their equally if not more valuable contributions. 
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Moreover, winners also receive a greater share of resources, and their work is communicated into 
the wider community more readily. As one laureate put it: “The world is peculiar in this matter of 
how it gives credit. It tends to give credit to [already] famous people” (Merton, 1968, p. 57).  
 Merton further distinguished between micro and macro levels of status effects associated 
with prize winners (Hayes, Lee & Smith, 2010). Regarding the micro effects, two scientists 
operating at a similar and comparable level of achievement and contribution will clearly receive 
different credit for their respective work when one is a winner of a prestigious award and the other 
is a near-winner. With regard to macro effects, high-status scientists receive cumulative advantage 
such that they enjoy disproportionate allocations of resources and rewards. Therefore, higher status 
prize winners attract higher payoffs in terms of resource, visibility and communication advantages, 
even though their work may be of equal quality to their lower status peers. Merton also highlighted 
the fact that young collaborators are obscured by the status of award winners so much that when a 
collaborator is the first author of a paper, it is often seen to be the work of the award winner wherein 
the collaborator is assigned less credit. In the words of one laureate: “When people see my name 
on a paper, they are apt to remember it and not to remember the other names” (Merton, 1968, p. 
57).  
 These evaluation biases due to status are readily shown in the sciences by Merton (1968) 
and have been investigated in other high achievement contexts like sports. Based on status 
characteristics theory, Kim and King (2014) posited that evaluators and judges of quality are biased 
in their quality evaluations of high-status performers, particularly when there is some ambiguity 
in their performance. To test this proposition, Kim and King (2014) reviewed umpiring decisions 
with respect to judgments of strike balls by pitchers in major league baseball games in the US. The 
decision of the umpire was compared with actual footage of when the ball crossed home plate and 
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compared with respect to high status and lower status pitchers. The findings showed that umpires 
were significantly more likely to call a pitch a strike rather than a ball with a high-status pitcher 
compared to a lower status pitcher. Consistent with the Matthew effect, judgments of high-status 
actors were more favorable whereas lower status actors faced more stringent evaluations of their 
performance.    
 Experimental research has also demonstrated biases associated with status shifts consistent 
with the Matthew effect. In their study, Pettit et al., (2013) investigated if a target who recently 
rose in status is evaluated more favorably than a target who descends in status even when they 
occupy the same ultimate status position. Participants in the study were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions where they either read that University X had risen in US ranking from 15th to 
11th best or read that University X had descended in rank from 7th to 11th best. Reflecting a status 
momentum effect, participants rated the positive status shift University higher in terms of prestige 
and respect than the negative status shift University. Moreover, participants also recommended 
that the positive status shift University was justified in seeking an increase in tuition fees. As put 
forward by Merton (1968), a positive status shift to a target appears to result in them receiving a 
disproportionate allocation of resources at the expense of equally meritorious targets with the same 
relative standing.     
According to the theoretical framework developed by Reschke et al., (2017), a positive status shift 
may lead to two general spillover outcomes: endorsement or competition outcomes. Positive status 
spillovers occur under an endorsement account such that the status conferred to an award winner 
flows to his or her associates or neighbors in the vicinity. Moreover, the benefits of status 
recognition to an individual are likely to spill over a whole group or category of associates wherein 
the legitimacy of an area of work is endorsed and accentuated. In contrast, a positive status shift 
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may lead to a competition for attention and resources in a zero-sum system; a focus on one 
individual prize winner may divert attention away from his or her neighbors. At the same time, 
conferment of a major award may resolve a contest for ideas; the award winners work becomes a 
de facto reference point for an idea such that interest in associated work is attenuated. To test the 
endorsement vs. competition account of positive status spillover, Reschke et al., (2017) 
investigated the citation rates of neighbor articles before and after an author was appointed to the 
prestigious Howard Hughes Medical Institute. Compared to matched control articles, the citation 
rate of neighbor articles experienced a 6.67 annual rate of decrease. Consistent with a competition 
account of negative spillover effects, the conferment of a prize appeared to divert attention away 
from works and actors in the vicinity of the prize winners’ professional neighborhood.  
 Status spillover effects were also found by Bothner, Hayes, Lee, and Smith (2010) in which 
the Matthew effect was diminished. By employing a formal mathematical model, they investigated 
if positive status shifts lead to status monopolization by an award winner (the Matthew effect) or 
there is a transfer of status to lower-ranked associates (spillover effects). The findings showed that 
when a high-status actor endorses others, there is a spillover of his or her status to lower-ranked 
associates. In fact, the full model suggested elites may undermine their cumulative advantage by 
the endorsement of others which would effectively attenuate the Matthew effect.   
 Positive spillover effects associated with status mobility have been further shown in the 
arts and business. In one study, Rossman et al., (2010) analyzed the top-10 credited roles from 
movies released in cinemas between 1936 and 2005 to determine if high-status associations 
spillover to other collaborators. The findings showed actors are most likely to receive significant 
status advantages when they work with elite collaborators. Similarly, Aarstad, Haugland, and 
Greve (2009) reported positive spillover effect in business associations. Their study investigated 
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the performance of entrepreneurs who were developing their own hydroelectric micro-power 
plants. Reflecting a positive spillover effect, entrepreneurs low in social capital performed better 
when they linked with associates higher in social capital. Moreover, entrepreneurs also benefitted 
by imitating the networking patterns of high-status associates, by gaining access to significant 
social capital.  
Thus, based on the Mathew effect we hypothesize that winning the Oscar should have a positive 
impact on the career outcome of the family members. We will evaluate the impact of positive 
status shift in the quality and quantity and quality of movies of the family members: 
Hypothesis 1: A family member’s positive status shift can bring more professional visibility 
to their relatives (more movies) 
Hypothesis 2: A family member’s positive status shift can attract higher quality projects for 
their relatives (better-rated movies) 
4.2.2. Negative Matthew Effects 
 More recent work has shown the downsides to significant positive status shifts. For 
example, Chan et al., (2015) investigated the collaborative activities of Nobel laureates before and 
after they received the prize. Independent of their scientific field or age, analysis of the publication 
collaborations of 198 Nobel laureates showed lower rates of co-authorship with new authors post 
award. In fact, laureates were more likely to be loyal to pre-award collaborations through greater 
co-authorship with pre-award authors than new authors after the conferment of the award. These 
results suggest that the range of opportunities given or pursued by a major award winner may 
narrow post-award reflecting a negative effect of positive status shifts in the sciences at least.   
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  Apart from the negative professional effects of status shocks, award winners may 
also experience negative personal consequences due to significant status disruption. In their study, 
Jensen and Kim (2015) empirically investigated anecdotal reports of the ‘Oscar Curse’; the 
experience of negative professional and personal consequences after the conferment of an Oscar. 
In the study, divorce rates of all the lead male and female actors were sampled from those who 
appeared in 1,023 top commercial and top artistic films from 1930 to 2005. The findings showed 
that the divorce rate was higher among male actors who received Oscar nominations or wins than 
those who did not, but lower among female actors. It would appear that the effects of status shock 
or disruption may spillover negatively into the award winners’ personal life.  
The disproportionate allocation of resources to those who are recipients of a positive status shift is 
argued by Bothner, Podolny, and Smith (2011) to be counterproductive. In direct contrast to the 
Matthew effect where prize winners receive a higher share of resources, they proposed that 
contests for output fare better when surplus resources go to lower status or marginalized targets. 
Labeled the Mark effect, Bothner el al (2011) argued that redistribution of resources by a 
tournament architect provided comparably better outcomes than rewarding the elite and 
accentuating their status momentum. They tested the Matthew vs. Mark effect by developing a 
formal model of status-based competition in which a tournament director can either support 
cumulative advantage or follow a course of redistribution. The results from modeling data showed 
that redistribution of resources largely produced better outcomes (Mark effect) compared to the 
disproportionate allocation of resources to high-status elites (Matthew effect).  
The negative effect of status shocks has also been shown with award winners in literature. Kovacs 
and Sharkey (2014) investigated if the benefits enjoyed by high-status award winners arise from 
biased perceptions as opposed to real differences in quality. They analyzed a dataset of reader 
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reviews of 32 prize-winning books that were nominated for the same award in the same year pre- 
and post-award and were rated similarly pre-award. Not surprisingly, prize-winning books attract 
more readers post-prize; however, they also experience a decline in readers’ ratings post award. 
Kovacs and Sharkey (2014) posit the notoriety that comes with awards leads to a more diverse 
audience with varied tastes who do not necessarily connect with the book. It may also be the case 
that some readers are put off by the increased popularity of a book and bias their evaluations of its 
qualities accordingly.  
As such, the following hypotheses were put forward for testing if the positive status shift of a 
family member has a negative spillover effect on their close relatives who are in the same industry. 
This could either happened because they attract all the attention or because of the Mark effect. We 
hypothesize that positive status shift of one family member reduces the visibility of other family 
members of the same show business family, and therefore they receive either fewer movie offers 
or offers for lower quality movies. Hence:  
 Hypothesis 3: A family member’s positive status shift can cause less professional visibility 
to their relatives (fewer movies). 
Hypothesis 4: A family member’s positive status shift can cause reception of lower quality 






4.3. Data and analysis:  
To investigate spillover effects to family members of Oscar winners more systematically, the 
current study focused on the U.S. film industry (“Hollywood”) which has been deemed a salient 
exemplar of a boundaryless, project-based and creative industry (Borgatti, Jones & Everett, 1998). 
Specifically, the study employed data from the International Movie Database (IMDb), which 
contains historical data points of Oscar winners and nominees in US feature films. We classify our 
sample into two categories: (1) individuals who are the close relatives of an Oscar winner. (2) 
Individuals who are the close relatives of an Oscar nominee.  
The close relatives include the following categories: parents, daughter, son, siblings, spouses. 
Our sample consists of individuals who have been nominated in the core crew categories. It is 
noteworthy that, based on the literature (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008; Goldman, 1983), core crew 
contain the following roles: producer, director, writer, editor, cinematographer, production 
designer, and composer.  
Once this list was collected, we checked the profile of each Oscar nominee and winner, read their 
biography on IMDB and IMDBPRO for their close relatives (defined above), we cross-checked 
the list with other online resources. Once the list was completed, a sample of 330 family members 
of Oscar winners and nominees, who have joined the industry at the time or after post active years 
of the nominee, was generated. Those relatives, whose career had ended before the first 





Career outcomes. We employ two measures to conceptualize career outcomes. The first 
career outcome measure is the average number of movies in which an individual played. We 
calculated this measure twice: (1) three years before the first nomination of their relatives, (2) three 
years after the first nomination of their relatives. This measure represents the quantity of projects 
in which an individual was involved. The second measure is the average rating of the movies in 
which an individual played a key role. We derive these ratings from The Internet Movie Database 
(IMDb). On the IMDb, movies are ranked by several individuals, including IMDb experts, on a 
scale from 1 to 10. The average of individual ratings forms a movie rating. This measure represents 
the quality of projects in which an individual was involved. In sum, we have two measures for 
career outcomes, each calculated twice. While the number of movies counts as the quantity of 
one’s career outcome, the average rating of movies refers to the quality of one’s career outcome. 
Although a movie is the outcome of an enormous collective effort, we assume that it could count 
as the outcome of individuals who played key roles in creating that movie and that participating in 
certain movies could count as “successful” or “unsuccessful” achievements for individuals. 
Control variables. We controlled for the impact of many variables. First, due to 
contradictory findings on the impact of gender on career development (Whiston & Keller, 2004), 
we controlled for individual’s gender. Second, we controlled for the type of relationship between 
the two individuals and have four categories: 1) parent,  2) child,  3) sibling, and 4) spouse. For 
the spouse category, we made sure that the marriage was not terminated within the six years under 
study (three years before and three years after the nomination). We take into account this dummy 
variable as the type of family tie might affect the positive status shift spillover differently. 
78 
Particularly, as Jensen and Kim (2015) empirically investigated the ‘Oscar Curse’ and the 
increased possibility of divorce post-nomination.   
4.3.2. Analyses 
To analyze our data, we use analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), which allows us to test 
whether various groups are significantly different in terms of means in certain variables, after 
controlling for covariates. 
4.4. Results 
We analyze the dependent variables (i.e., the number of movies played and the average of 
movie ratings) with ANCOVA with two conditions (Oscar winners’ family members vs. Oscar 
Nominees’ family members). The dependent variables are measured twice (average three years 
before the event and average three years after the event). Thus, we ran four analyses (two 
dependent variables × two measurement times) presented in table 10. Covariates contain gender 
and type of family ties. 
The first hypothesis states that a family member’s positive status shift can bring more 
professional visibility to their relatives measured by the quantity of movies they will play in post-
event. The second hypothesis states the similar logic, but about the quality of the movie a family 
member will play in, post-Oscar event. Followed by the contradicting view (Mark effect) 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 states the negative effect of family member nomination/win on their close 
relatives’ career outcome post-event. To test these hypotheses, we conducted ANCOVA, with the 
number of movies played and the average of movie ratings in three year intervals before and after 
the event as the dependent variables, and the family member win or nomination in the Oscar as the 
fixed factor. 
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Table 10 summarizes the results from the ANCOVA analyses for the outcome variables 
among the two conditions. 
For the quantity of career outcome measure, the number of movies played, the analysis 
showed that there is no significant difference between the dependent variable among the two 
groups within the three years average career lives (F = 1.12; ŋ2 = .01). However, there was a 
significant difference among the three groups in the number of movies played, in the second (F = 
3.44; p < .05; ŋ2 = .02). For each condition, we examined the pattern of means within and between 
measurement times. Table 9 displays each condition’s mean in the number of movies played. 
Figure 3 represents the pattern of means within conditions and between the three years prior, and 
the three years after the event. 
-Table 9 & 10 about here – 
For the second career outcome measure, the average rating of the movies played, the results 
are almost consistent with those from the analysis of the first career outcome measure. The 
ANCOVA analysis showed that there is no significant difference between the dependent variable 
among the three groups within the first three years of individuals’ career lives (F = .65; ŋ2 = .01). 
However, there was a significant difference among the two groups in the average rating of the 
movies played, in the second (F = 10.19; p < .01; ŋ2 = .07) three year intervals. For each condition, 
we examined the pattern of means within and between measurement times. Table 9 shows each 
condition’s mean in the average of the movies played. Figure 4 represents the pattern of means 
within conditions and between the three year intervals.  
-Figure 4 about here - 
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Based on the previous results, the quality of movie increased for both categories post-
nomination/win, and it follows Mathew effect (positive spillover effect) support for hypothesis 2. 
These results are the contrary of what we proposed in Hypothesis 1 and supported in Hypothesis 
3. With regards to quality, positive growth for both categories of winners and nominees can be 
detected, however, a negative trend for the family members of nominees is evident for the number 
of movies they appeared in post-nomination event. Therefore, we identify a mix of Mathew and 
Mark effects for family members of Oscar nominees and winners.  
4.5. Discussion: 
The current study aims to address the question of whether or not positive status shifts 
generate spillover benefits to associates or near neighbors of award winners in the arts; specifically, 
winners of the prestigious Oscar award. On the surface, there would appear to be a positive 
spillover effect for family members of Oscar winners. When Ben Affleck won the Oscar, his 
brother was nominated a few years afterward and received his first Oscar within 4-5 years of when 
Ben received his second Oscar. The spillover effect is even more prominent in the family of Francis 
Ford Coppola. His daughter, Sofia Coppola, won an Oscar for writing her second film and his son 
Roman Coppola is a Golden Globe-winning filmmaker. Moreover, his other son, Gian-Carlo 
Coppola, was a film producer and his daughter, Gia Coppola, debuted in her own film in 2013. 
Francis’s sister, Talia Shire, is also an Academy Award-nominated actress whose son is the 
successful actor Jason Schwartzman. The brother of Francis, August Coppola was a prominent 
film academic and executive whose son is Oscar-winning actor Nicolas Cage (Calautti, 2017). 
 The effect is mixed for family members of Oscar nominees post-event, they tend to 
appear in fewer movies but slightly better quality movies.  
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The research focussed on addressing a central research question: To what extent does 
winning an Oscar positively affect the professional outcomes of family members of an Oscar 
winner? In other words, does the positive status shift associated with winning an Oscar spillover 
to family members in terms of access to higher status roles and managerial opportunities, more 
professional visibility, and their longevity within the industry? Whereas research suggests award 
winners in the domain of science may experience negative spillover effects (e.g., Reschke, et al., 
2017), other findings indicate positive spillover effects associated with Oscar award winners.  
Overall, theory and research on the social and psychological impact of significant status 
shifts demonstrate that award winners attract a disproportionate share of notoriety and resources 
at the expense of equally deserving near winners; generally known as the Matthew effect. 
Moreover, evaluations of prize winners and the elite have been shown to be affected by biases that 
enhance their status or evaluate their performance more favorably than their peers of comparable 
achievement or equal standing. Disproportionate allocation of resources to the elite is further 
argued to be counterproductive in contrast to a redistribution of resources among lower status 
actors where outcomes are likely to be more positive. Further work on the social and psychological 
impact of significant status shifts also demonstrates the negative effects that may occur to the 
recipients of awards.  In summary, positive status shifts appear to be associated with spillover 
effects such that neighbors of high-status award winners may be positively or negatively affected 
by their association.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we studied the impact of kinship and family supports on other family members’ career 
outcome.  We addressed the fact that how business families can facilitate career success for their 
family members is under-investigated. We examined the phenomena of kinship strategies in the 
form of direct and indirect nepotism as a mechanism for helping descendants improve their career 
performance in an internationally competitive networked industry. We provided much ground for 
future research beyond Hollywood in other industries, in the fields of direct and more indirect 
forms of nepotism in creative industries, boundaryless careers family firms, and gender 
discrimination. We propose that family business scholars will find fertile ground for future 
research by investigating multigenerational family involvement with corporate hierarchies, 
professions, as well as other fields of endeavor. We addressed the issue of gender inequities that 
are especially prevalent in boundaryless careers. Our contribution here is to examine the 
potentially beneficial effects of family support on women’s career performance.  
We also extended kinship studies to marriage. Our study indicates that marriage between 
Hollywood industry participants and the potential for borrowed spousal capital that it creates, 
benefits both parties.  It demonstrates that the extent to which Alter has extensive connections, 
centrality, status; Ego will benefit of more opportunities for employment. Interestingly and 
probably, due to the configuration of the project-based movie industry, a network with more 
constraint is a preferable form of social capital.  In many respects, these findings confirm the work 
of Granovetter (1973, 2005), Lin (2001) and Coleman (1990) with respect to the efficacy of social 
capital and the value of non-redundant information concerning certain types of social networks. 
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However, we call attention to the role of kinship in facilitating the cultivation of social capital in 
an unexpected industry setting. 
Moreover, our study indicates the limits on the value of social capital for women as it pertains to 
career advancement to managerial roles in Hollywood, and confirms the presence of gender 
stereotyping and homophile in the U.S. film industry.  Thus this study demonstrates that borrowed 
spousal social capital has value for women in project-based industries, but only in terms of gaining 
more work and not necessarily career advancement, which contradicts Burt’s findings (1998) in a 
more traditional industry setting. Whether these conclusions suggest that women cannot truly 
attain power or status in Hollywood, or in other project-based industries, remains an open question. 
We also addressed the importance of closed network with more constraint that found to be more 
significant than a network with brokerage opportunities. 
On top of this, positive status shift spillover effect on career outcome of family members can have 
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Table 1.Correlations, means and standard deviations 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level  
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Age 26.89 11.62 1             
2. Gender, 
     Female =1 
0.53 0.49 -0.13* 1          
  
3. support type 2.05 0.87 -0.44** -0.2 1           
4. Count of movies 
first 3 years 
2.65 3.55 0.10** -.065* -0.03 1        
  
5. Count of movies 
second  3 years 
1.38 2.25 -0.03 0.02 0.15 0.54** 1       
  
6. Count of movies 
third  3 years 
2.73 4.1 -0.14 0.01 0.42 0.08** 0.57** 1      
  
7. Average ratings 
first 3 years 
6.07 1.41 -0.13** 0.95** 0.24 -0.01 0.09** 0.08** 1     
  
8. Average ratings 
second 3 years 
6.02 1.36 -0.13** 0.11* 0.27 0.01 0.08* 0.09** 0.94** 1    
  
9. Average ratings 
third  3 years 
6.01 1.30 -0.14** 0.13** 0.27 0.02 0.10* 0.10** 0.85** 0.91** 1   
  
10. count of movies 
in 10 years 
7.6 8.23 -0.03 -0.02 .024* 0.74* 0.85* 0.77* 0.073* 0.08* 0.09* 1  
  
11. Average ratings 
in 10 years  
5.99 1.26 -0.14* 0.12* 0.36* 0.01 0.09* 0.10* 0.96* 0.98* 0.98* 0.08* 1 
  
12. Number of 
relatives in the 
industry 
1.72 1.14 -.203** -.290** .148** -.092* .166** .231** .029 .024 .046 .163** .034 1  
13.Times worked 
with relatives 
6.76 8.58 -.120** -.108** .122** .225** .557** .597** .069 .078 .089* .583** .081 .744** 1 
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Table 2 Regression analysis - performance index 1. DV: Quantity, Number of Movies (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 




First decade First 3 years Second 3 years 
Third 3 years 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Age 0.0567* 0.0567* 0.0310* 0.0312* 0.0174* 0.0180* 0.00823 0.00743 
Number of relatives -4.089*** -4.086*** -1.053*** -1.034*** -0.915*** -0.864*** -2.121*** -2.188*** 
in the industry         
Times worked with 0.996*** 0.994*** 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.233*** 0.230*** 0.587*** 0.590*** 
relatives         
Direct Nepotism (DN) 2.622*** 2.454*** 0.215 0.0284 0.706*** 0.473* 1.701*** 1.953*** 
Indirect Nepotism (IN) 5.436*** 5.431*** 0.884*** 0.758*** 1.327*** 0.948*** 3.224*** 3.724*** 
Gender :Female -1.339*** -1.423* -0.587** -0.768* -0.111 -0.495* -0.641** -0.161 
CN x Female  0.321  0.374  0.499  0.551 
PMN x Female  0.540**  0.267  0.733**  0.956* 
R2 0.336 0.338 0.054 0.055 0.235 0.239 0.485 0.487 
Δ R2 0.330 0.002 0.04 0.001 0.211 0.004 0.355 0.002 
Adj. R2 0.332 0.335 0.051 0.052 0.231 0.236 0.481 .0483 




Table 3 Regression analysis - performance index 2. DV: Quality,  Movie average rating 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 First decade 
First 3 years Second 3 years Third 3 years 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Age 0.00867* 0.00924* 0.00832* 0.00898* 0.00910* 0.00965* 0.00861* 0.00910* 
Times worked with 
relatives 
0.0519 0.0970* 0.0622 0.115* 0.0312 0.0754 0.0622 0.100* 
Number of relatives 
In the industry 
0.00893 0.00748 0.00772 0.00584 0.0108* 0.00936 0.00822 0.00724 
Direct Nepotism (DN) 0.942*** 0.590*** 0.928*** 0.519*** 0.982*** 0.639*** 1.081*** 0.913*** 
Indirect Nepotism (IN) 1.074*** 0.978*** 1.016*** 0.880*** 1.126*** 1.025*** 1.015*** 1.029*** 
Gender :Female=1 0.142 0.157 0.110 -0.250 0.124 -0.172 0.193** -0.0487 
DN x Female  0.234  0.317  0.242  0.144 
IN x Female  0.654***  0.768***  0.641***  0.554*** 
R2 0.176 0.188 0.145 0.159 0.170 0.181 0.184 0.193 
F 33.44 28.67 26.72 23.96 32.55 27.28 35.72 30.45 
N 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 
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Table 4- Correlation Table 
 Bivariate correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.Ego Gender 1.00 .118** .095** 0.05 .116** .061* 0.02 0.02 .074** .062* 0.04 .079** -.059* -0.03 -0.05 
2. Ego role before 
marriage (BM) 
.118** 1.00 -.128** -.646** .309** .108** -0.01 0.05 .255** .198** 0.02 .121** .083** 0.02 0.03 
3. Ego role after marriage 
(AM) 
.095** -.128** 1.00 .702** -.080** .103** -.069* -.160** .092** .101** 0.01 0.02 .083** 0.01 0.02 
4. Ego change of role 0.05 -.646** .702** 1.00 -.186** 0.05 -0.02 -.126** -.088** -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
5. Ego experience (BM) .116** .309** -.080** -.186** 1.00 .125** .058* .376** .137** .159** 0.06 .106** 0.04 0.03 0.02 
6. Ego Oscar experience 
BM 
.061* .108** .103** 0.05 .125** 1.00 0.01 -0.02 .151** .155** 0.00 .158** 0.04 -0.01 0.00 
7. Marriage Duration 0.02 -0.01 -.069* -0.02 .058* 0.01 1.00 .348** -0.02 -.066* 0.00 0.02 -.082** -0.01 0.00 
8. Type of Marriage 
termination 
0.02 0.05 -.160** -.126** .376** -0.02 .348** 1.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
9. Ego Count of movies 
(AM) 
.074** .255** .092** -.088** .137** .151** -0.02 -0.03 1.00 .665** .057* .341** .070* 0.03 0.02 
10. Ego Degree BM .062* .198** .101** -0.05 .159** .155** -.066* -0.03 .665** 1.00 .231** .254** .184** .075** 0.04 
11. Ego Eigen BM 0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.02 .057* .231** 1.00 0.02 0.05 .076** 0.01 
12. Ego Constraint BM .079** .121** 0.02 -0.03 .106** .158** 0.02 -0.04 .341** .254** 0.02 1.00 0.04 0.02 .081** 
13. Alter Degree BM -.059* .083** .081** 0.02 0.04 0.04 -.082** -0.03 .070* .184** 0.05 0.04 1.00 .115** .262** 
14. Alter Eigen BM -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 .075** .076** 0.02 .115** 1.00 0.03 
15. Alter Constraint BM -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 .081** .262** 0.03 1.00 
Point bi serial gender – categorical 
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Table 5 - Binomial Regression Count of the Movies in the Next Three Years (Random and Fixed Effects) - Alter Degree 
 Full - Model 
1 (Fixed) 
Full - Model 2 
(random) 
Female - Model 
3 (Fixed) 
Female - Model 4 
(random) 
Male - Model 5 
(Fixed) 
Male - Model 6 
(random) 
Ego-Gender 0.185 0.0393     
 (0.73) (0.66)     
Alter Degree 0.00381*** 0.00398*** 0.00339*** 0.00374*** 0.00418*** 0.00422*** 
 (8.44) (9.61) (4.97) (6.10) (7.14) (7.54) 
Ex Ante-Type of Role 1.859*** 0.665*** 1.282** 0.854*** 6.102*** 0.547*** 
 (4.19) (12.69) (3.23) (10.06) (3.64) (8.26) 
Ego-Age-Marriage -0.0484*** -0.00986** -0.0596** -0.0175** -0.0706** -0.00791* 
 (-4.37) (-2.95) (-2.97) (-2.80) (-3.10) (-1.98) 
Ego change of Role 2.031*** 0.675*** 1.580** 0.815*** 4.245*** 0.581*** 
 (4.14) (11.32) (3.05) (8.59) (3.69) (7.63) 
Marriage Status 0.184*** 0.197*** 0.248*** 0.264*** 0.127** 0.151*** 
 (5.45) (5.64) (4.56) (4.84) (3.07) (3.33) 
Ex Ante-Ego-Exper 0.441* 0.105** 0.431 0.0341 -0.495 0.155** 
 (2.42) (2.59) (1.89) (0.54) (-1.11) (2.87) 
Constant -4.064*** -1.352*** -2.375* -1.566*** -8.345*** -1.077*** 
 (-3.78) (-7.25) (-2.03) (-5.23) (-3.65) (-4.13) 
ln_r  2.553***  2.513***  2.621*** 
Constant  (26.37)  (18.01)  (19.09) 
ln_s       
Constant  1.047***  1.073***  1.060*** 
  (12.69)  (8.66)  (9.48) 
Observations 8001 8649 3609 3888 4392 4761 
Pseudo R2       
t statistics in parentheses  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
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Table 6 - Binomial Regression Count of the Movies in the Next Three Years (Random and Fixed Effects) - Alter Eigen 
 Full - Model 
1 (Fixed) 
Full - Model 
2 (random) 
Female - Model 
3 (Fixed) 
Female - Model 
4 (random) 
Male - Model 
5 (Fixed) 
Male – Model  6 
(random) 
Ego-Gender 0.120 0.0144     
 (0.51) (0.24)     
Alter Eigen 0.866* 0.697* 1.226* 1.018* 0.616 0.407 
 (2.35) (2.03) (2.40) (2.18) (1.18) (0.80) 
Ex Ante-Type of Role 1.613*** 0.685*** 1.225** 0.874*** 5.030*** 0.568*** 
 (3.64) (13.00) (3.15) (10.20) (4.00) (8.55) 
Ego-Age-Marriage -0.0473*** -0.0112*** -0.0586** -0.0178** -0.0592** -0.00971* 
 (-4.44) (-3.33) (-2.95) (-2.83) (-3.22) (-2.42) 
Ego change of Role 1.775*** 0.704*** 1.543** 0.858*** 3.529*** 0.599*** 
 (3.54) (11.77) (3.03) (9.00) (4.16) (7.84) 
Marriage Status 0.204*** 0.217*** 0.267*** 0.284*** 0.150*** 0.172*** 
 (6.00) (6.20) (4.90) (5.19) (3.59) (3.79) 
Ex Ante-Ego-Exper 0.483** 0.115** 0.452* 0.0456 -0.375 0.163** 
 (2.71) (2.82) (2.02) (0.72) (-0.95) (3.02) 
Constant -3.490** -1.361*** -2.285* -1.614*** -7.260*** -1.091*** 
 (-3.11) (-7.32) (-1.97) (-5.36) (-4.12) (-4.22) 
ln_r       
Constant  2.494***  2.459***  2.553*** 
  (26.31)  (17.87)  (19.22) 
ln_s       
Constant  1.030***  1.043***  1.053*** 
  (12.55)  (8.51)  (9.42) 
Observations 8001 8649 3609 3888 4392 4761 
Pseudo R2       
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7 -Binomial Regression Count of the Movies in the Next Three Year - Alter Constraint 
 Full – Model 1 
(Fixed)) 
Full - Model 2 
(random) 
Female – Model 3 
(Fixed) 
Female - Model 4 
(random) 
Male - Model 5 
(Fixed) 
Male - Model 6 
(random) 
Ego-Gender 0.170 0.0309     
 (0.70) (0.52)     
Alter Constraint 1.612*** 1.809*** 1.427*** 1.752*** 1.859*** 1.904*** 
 (6.34) (7.59) (4.06) (5.43) (5.07) (5.33) 
Ex Ante-Type of Role 1.773*** 0.677*** 1.219** 0.857*** 5.001*** 0.566*** 
 (4.04) (12.95) (3.11) (10.12) (4.07) (8.55) 
Ego-Age-Marriage -0.0467*** -0.0111*** -0.0574** -0.0186** -0.0603** -0.00925* 
 (-4.32) (-3.32) (-2.87) (-2.97) (-3.28) (-2.31) 
Ego change of Role 1.890*** 0.693*** 1.482** 0.838*** 3.503*** 0.595*** 
 (3.98) (11.68) (2.93) (8.89) (4.20) (7.82) 
Marriage Status 0.193*** 0.209*** 0.255*** 0.274*** 0.139*** 0.164*** 
 (5.71) (5.98) (4.68) (5.02) (3.32) (3.62) 
Ex Ante-Ego-Exper 0.420* 0.113** 0.437 0.0471 -0.369 0.161** 
 (2.30) (2.79) (1.94) (0.76) (-0.95) (2.98) 
Constant -3.821*** -1.363*** -2.262 -1.578*** -7.188*** -1.100*** 
 (-3.58) (-7.36) (-1.94) (-5.29) (-4.14) (-4.24) 
ln_r       
Constant  2.529***  2.499***  2.587*** 
  (26.35)  (17.93)  (19.19) 
ln_s       
Constant  1.053***  1.084***  1.063*** 
  (12.71)  (8.70)  (9.47) 
Observations 8001 8649 3609 3888 4392 4761 
Pseudo R2       
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 8 -Multinomial Regression - Change of Roles- EX post marriage 
 
t statistics in parentheses    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
 Full - Model 1  Female - Model 2 Male - Model 3 
1 DEMOTE    
Ego-Gender -0.324 0 0 
 (-1.81) (.) (.) 
Marriage Status -0.0131 -0.189 -0.282 
 (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) 
Alter Degree -0.00416 -0.00254 -0.00384 
 (-1.13) (-0.57) (-0.56) 
Alter Eigen 3.502 -6.392 -1.152 
 (0.37) (-0.68) (-0.01) 
Alter Constraint -1.837 -1.307 -3.882 
 (-0.78) (-0.54) (-0.77) 
Ex Ante-Ego-Exper 0.218* 0.176 0.254 
 (2.20) (1.33) (1.69) 
Ego - Degree -0.00403 -0.00436 -0.000528 
 (-1.07) (-0.65) (-0.11) 
Ego - Eigen Centrality -60.56 46.24 -469.3 
 (-0.97) (0.65) (-1.19) 
Ego Constraint -0.184 -4.156 0.691 
 (-0.09) (-0.88) (0.32) 
Constant -1.139*** -0.884** -1.642*** 
 (-5.21) (-3.12) (-4.79) 
2 PRMOTE    
Ego-Gender 0.413** 0 0 
 (2.84) (.) (.) 
Marriage Status 15.52 13.51 16.79 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Alter Degree 0.00227 0.00388 0.000130 
 (0.96) (1.02) (0.04) 
Alter Eigen -1.167 -3.167 74.04 
 (-0.21) (-0.32) (1.03) 
Alter Constraint -0.917 -2.448 0.425 
 (-0.58) (-0.87) (0.15) 
Ex Ante-Ego-Exper -0.730*** -0.926*** -0.544*** 
 (-9.14) (-7.18) (-5.25) 
Ego - Degree 0.00273 0.0101* 0.000376 
 (1.01) (1.97) (0.11) 
Ego - Eigen Centrality -6.724 10.71 -13.38 
 (-0.38) (0.13) (-0.42) 
Ego Constraint 1.987 -2.214 1.948 
 (1.49) (-0.54) (1.28) 
Constant 0.864*** 1.366*** 0.844*** 
 (5.88) (6.72) (4.32) 
Observations 1167   563 604 






Table 9 - Mean and Standard Deviations for Career Outcomes  as a Function of Family Positive 












 Oscar winning family member  
(n = 96) 
Oscar Nominated family member 
(n = 234) 
 
Before the event After the event Before the event After the event 

























Table 10 - Results of ANCOVA and Comparison of Means Analysis for Individuals’ Career 
Outcomes (n = 330). 
 Between condition effect (F) 
 Before After 








Partial ŋ2 shown in parentheses. 
* p < .05 
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Figure 2 - The interaction of support type (nepotism vs sponsorship) and gender on the 



























Figure 3 – Mean change of average number of movies played 3 years 







Figure 4– Mean change of average rating of movies played 3 years before and 3 years after 
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